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Abstract
This chapter focuses on the economic mechanisms at work in recent mod-
els of advertising nance in media markets developed around the concept of
two-sided markets. The objective is to highlight new and original insights
from this approach, and to clarify the conceptual aspects. The chapter
rst develops a canonical model of two-sided markets for advertising, where
platforms deliver content to consumers and resell their "attention" to adver-
tisers. A key distinction is drawn between free media and pay media, where
the former result from the combination of valuable consumer attention and
low ad nuisance cost. The rst part discusses various conceptual issues
such as equilibrium concepts and the nature of ine¢ ciencies in advertising
markets, and concrete issues such as congestion and second-degree discrimi-
nation. The second part is devoted to recent contributions on issues arising
when consumers patronize multiple platforms. In this case, platforms can
only charge incremental values to advertisers which reduces their market
power and a¤ects their price strategies and advertising levels. The last part
discusses the implications of the two-sided nature of the media markets for
the choice of content and diversity.
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1 Introduction
Media markets are important for their consumption value to consumers, their con-
duit of potential consumers to advertisers in generating product sales, communi-
cation of political information to voters, and the ongoing transformational impact
of the Internet. Most media markets are nanced all in part by advertising. This
aspect renders them substantially di¤erent from standard product markets, re-
quiring a dedicated analysis of their performance. Such analysis has (surprisingly)
only developed in detail over the last decade or so, with the recognition that they
are two-sided markets. A two-sided market is one where two groups of agents, here
media consumers and advertisers, interact through intermediaries (platforms).
The consequences for market performance are quite profound. Platforms face a
two-sided equilibrium balance calculus to extract revenues from (potentially) both
sides interacting on them, and must account for the consequences of attracting
more participants on one side on the participation on the other side. In the media
context, this means that the business model is to deliver potential consumers to
advertisers while advertiser presence is typically a turn-o¤ for consumers. Surplus
and merger analysis must account for the impacts on three groups of agents. Con-
sumer sovereignty can be indirect in such markets because consumers are valuable
only insofar as they are desired by advertisers.
In the sequel, we rst describe the preferences and objectives of the agents
interacting through the platforms. We then set out (in Section 3) the equilib-
rium analysis of two-sided market balance when media consumers choose only one
platform (single-homing consumers). The competitive bottleneck induced from
single-homing begets several puzzles for the positive analysis and strong conclu-
sions for the normative analysis. These are addressed through considering the
possibility that (some) consumers multi-home (Section 4). Multi-homing gives
rise to incremental pricing of ads whereby platforms can only charge for the extra
value they deliver to (multi-homing) advertisers. This leads to a reluctance for
platforms to deliver multi-homing consumers due to their lower value. Section
5 draws some implications for platform content choice in both product speci-
cations (short-run) and overall product diversity (long-run). Section 6 concludes
with some outstanding research directions.
2 Cast of characters
The essence of two-sided markets is that the interaction between two groups of
actors is mediated by platforms. In media markets, the two groups are advertisers
and consumers, and the platforms are the media themselves. The general theory of
such markets was rst propounded by Caillaud and Jullien (2001, 2003) and Rochet
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and Tirole (2003), and has been further elaborated in a voluminous literature. Key
milestones and surveys are Armstrong (2006) and Rochet and Tirole (2006).
This literature traditionally distinguishes between usage externalities and par-
ticipation externalities. Usage externalities arise (for example) for credit cards or
click-through advertising, where the platform charges its members per interaction,
so that individual interaction behavior matters. Participation externalities arise
(for instance) for club membership, where platforms charge their members for ac-
cess, so that potential members care about the level of participation on the other
side. The distinction, although a useful operational tool, is somewhat articial
as it depends as much on tari¤ structure choices as on technologies (see Rochet
and Tirole, 2006).1 As with many two-sided markets, typical media markets (and
models thereof) involve elements of both.
The theoretical literature on platform economics has traditionally concentrated
on cases where there are no own-side network e¤ects participation has no direct
e¤ect on the well-being of other members on ones own side of the market but
there are cross-side network e¤ects, which can be either positive or negative.2 In
the media context, consumers typically do not care about how many other con-
sumers are engaged on a medium (modulo fashion and water-cooler e¤ects), but
advertisers might well care whether competitors are also airing ads. Advertisers
want an audience, the larger the better, so there is a positive network e¤ect of
consumer side size on advertiser benets. The relation in the other direction can
be positive or negative (or indeed can vary across consumers). Typically, one
thinks of television and radio advertising as a net nuisance to consumers insofar
as any consumer surplus enabled from the advertising (in terms of information
about better purchase options, or enhanced product satisfaction) is outweighed by
intrusive interruption of the program content. Specialty magazines may involve
positive net benets,3 especially insofar as ads in magazines (and newspapers too)
are more easily skipped over, and readers may want to nd out more about prod-
ucts related to a hobby (sailing or golf mags) or purchase opportunities (classied
ads in newspapers).
To be sure, some media are not nanced by advertising at all. Such cases
(HBO, Sirius radio, and Consumer Reports which has a mandate not to carry
ads) are easily treated as standard one-sided markets, whereby media rms set
prices and consumers choose among options in a standard manner, although such
cases are rather rare. Instead, whenever consumers are paying attention (even
1For instance, credit cards charge a fee per transaction to sellers but an annual fee to buyers
(along with rebating bonus points), implying that buyers care about overall seller adoption (see
Bedre-Defolie and Calvano, 2013).
2Exceptions include Nocke, Peitz, and Stahl (2007) and Belleamme and Toulemonde (2009).
3See the Chandra and Kaiser Chapter in this Volume for more details on the empirical evidence
for positive benets.
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sub-consciously, as with billboards), then there is a latent demand to send them
advertising messages. Witness the sponsors emblems on soccer players shirts
and the billboards around the soccer eld. Thus the common form of business
model is either joint nance with both advertisers and subscribers footing the
bill (magazines) or advertisers only paying ultimately for the programming (free-
to-air or commercial television and radio). The business model is then as
follows. The platforms want to attract consumers in order to sell their attention
to advertisers. The program content is the bait, or lure, which in turn is either
denigrated by the ads piggy-backed upon it (when ads are a nuisance) or indeed
part of the attraction (when ads have a positive value). The program is thus a
conduit for the ads to reach prospective customers, who are in turn not attracted
primarily by the ads (infomercials aside!) but by the entertainment content. In
this context, the platformsproblem is to balance between extracting revenue from
advertisers, while delivering consumers who might be put-o¤by the ads, and switch
over, or switch o¤.4 Viewed in this light, one might anticipate a marginal condition
for the equilibrium at which the elasticity of revenue per viewer is equal consumer
participation elasticity, and that is exactly what we deliver formally below.
We next give some notation, and discuss more the three legs of the market,
continuing to mix our metaphors somewhat between the various media applica-
tions.
2.1 Consumers
The media consumers are the readers, viewers, listeners, or (web-)surfers. They
choose whether or not to subscribe to a particular channel (if there is a subscription
fee) or buy a magazine, and how much time and attention to pay to it (depending
in part on the quality of the publication, how it matches with the consumers
tastes, and the number and types of ads carried). They may indeed consume
several channels, although with most media they can only devote attention to one
at a time.5 While engaged with a channel, a consumer may register some of the
ads on it, and she might buy something she otherwise would not have.
Given the complexities of modeling the e¤ects in the previous paragraph in
terms of the mapping from subscription fees and ad levels to ultimate purchases,
it is not too surprising that the literature has taken some drastic simplications.
One of the least egregious is the assumption that the ad nuisance (or desire for ad
exposure) can be monetized into dollar terms. Frequently it is assumed that all
4This is one instance of a more general trade-o¤ between third-party nancing and consumers
participation that is analyzed in depth by Hagiu and Jullien (2012).
5Multi-tasking across media is becoming more common with the advent of the internet, al-
though even with traditional media it is sometimes possible (reading the newspaper while listen-
ing to the radio).
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consumers face the same valuation/cost per ad, and that it is moreover a linear
function of ad volume on the channel. Thus, the full price from watching channel
i is
fi = si + ai; i = 1; :::; n;
where si  0 is the subscription price, ai is the ad volume carried on the channel,
and  is the (net) nuisance per ad (which may be negative if ads are enjoyable).6
With these prices in mind, consumer choice of what to watch is determined
by utility maximization. The standard assumption has been that consumers make
a discrete choice of which (single) channel to engage with, and so the apparatus
of discrete choice models (or spatial competition models) has frequently been de-
ployed. This reects that a consumer can typically only engage a single channel at
a time, and the import of this single-homingassumption was only recently recog-
nized. Indeed, the modeling of multi-homingconsumer choice is quite elaborate,
and still in its infancy (more details are given in Section 4), even if the practice
is perhaps becoming even more prevalent with increased internet penetration (see
Peitz and Reisinger, this Volume). In broad then consumer choice delivers a de-
mand system of substitute products whereby the number of consumers choosing
channel i is (denoting f i the vector of other platformsprices)
Ni (fi; f i)
which is decreasing in the rst argument and increasing in each element of the
vector of all other channelsfull prices.
While many contributions rely on discrete choice models such as the Hotelling
duopoly model, the Vickrey-Salop circle model or the Logit model, an alternative
interpretation of Ni is that it measures the total time or attention devoted by
consumers to the media platform (see Gal-Or and Dukes (2003) and Dukes (2006)).
Some contributions use a representative consumer model (e.g., Kind, Nilssen, and
Sorgard, 2007, 2009). These are discussed in detail below, as are extensions of
the Hotelling-type models to allow for individual consumer demand for multiple
platforms (multi-homing).
Consumer surplus (from the channel decisions) is then measured in standard
fashion given the consumers optimization problem and the full prices faced.
2.2 Advertisers
Advertisers are assumed to derive some benet from reaching consumers. This
should realistically depend on the number and types of other advertisers reaching
6Thus the nuisance might allow for netting o¤ expected consumer surplus from buying ad-
vertised products.
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them, and also the types and numbers of consumers reached. Both of these hetero-
geneities are typically set aside. That is, rst, the value to a particular advertiser
from reaching a consumer is usually assumed independent of the specic platform
via which she is reached (thus ignoring the matching problem that readers of a
motorcycling magazine are more likely to be interested in chain-lube than those
of a sailing magazine).7 Second, the value per consumer is independent of the
number of consumers reached,8 so there are constant returns to advertising (this
would not be the case if there were non-constant marginal production costs for
advertisersgoods, for example).9
Third, competition in the product market is suppressed (so GMs returns from
advertising are independent of whether Ford also advertises). This assumption is
most tenable when ads are from di¤erent sectors and there are negligible income
e¤ects (so that the chance the consumer buys the steak-knife is independent of
whether she accepts the mortgage renance). Dukes and Gal-Or (2003), Gal-
Or and Dukes (2003, 2006) and Dukes (2003, 2004, 2006) analyze media with
advertising for competing products.
Except where explicitly noted to the contrary, we assume away limited at-
tention and congestion (Anderson-de Palma, 2009, Van Zandt, 2004) so that the
return from an ad does not depend on how many other advertisers reach the same
individual.
Under these assumptions, we can rank the advertiser willingness-to-pay per
consumer in standard fashion, from high to low to generate the advertiser demand
curve for impressions on a per consumer basis. Moreover, when each consumer can
be reached through one platform (single-homing), the decision to buy advertising
space on any platform is independent of the decision for other platforms. Hence
the single-homing assumption for consumers implies that advertisers put ads on
multiple platforms (they multi-home).
Let then v (a) denote the willingness-to-pay per consumer for the a-th highest
advertiser. If a platform gets the top a advertisers, its price per ad per consumer
is v (a) and its revenue per ad per consumer is
R (a) = av (a) :
Assume that the corresponding marginal revenue R0 (a) slopes down in standard
fashion.
7For exceptions, see the literature on targeting, such as Athey, Calvano, and Gans (2014)
discussed in the last Section.
8In models where demand is measured by the time spend on the platform, the unit of demand
is consumer time and the assumption is that the value per unit of time is constant.
9As Rysman (2004, p.491) puts it, "advertiser prot per look is constant."
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2.3 Media platforms
Media platforms are assumed to maximize their prots. Abstracting for the mo-
ment from costs (and therefore quality) of providing programming, then under
pure advertising nance (so si = 0 for all i), prot is i = Piai with Pi the price
of an ad on platform i. With mixed nance, prot is i = Piai + siNi. We
unpack these prot functions and draw out tractable ways to deal with them in
oligopolistic platform competition in the next Section.
2.4 Other players
To be sure, there are many other agents interacting in the production of the
nal product (such as ad agencies, content producers like journalists and program
producers, cable providers and distributors and the ilk see especially Armstrong
and Crawford, this Volume). These are often set aside in the analyses in order
to concentrate on the major market interaction we focus upon here, namely the
two-sided market interaction between advertisers and consumers as arbitrated by
the platforms.
3 Equilibrium analysis of single-homing viewers
/ readers / listeners / surfers
We start out with the analysis of pure advertising nance. For technological rea-
sons in the di¢ culty of excluding and pricing access to a pure public good (the
TV or radio signal, say), the early days of broadcasting involved such a business
model. Only fairly recently, with the advent of signal scramblers and descramblers,
did it become economically viable to have viewers pay for platform access. The
case of pure ad nance is also one type of equilibrium regime in the panoply of
broader tari¤ choices, as seen below.
The key step in nding an equilibrium is to use the structure imposed above
in order to regroup and rewrite the platforms prot:
i = Piai
= v (ai)Ni
 
ai;a i

ai
= R (ai)Ni
 
ai;a i

:
That is, the prot which is the product of the price per ad times the volume of ads
aired can be split up and repacked as prot per ad per viewer times ad volume,
and then reconstituted as the ad revenue per viewer times the number of viewers.
We can thus nd an equilibrium to the game between platforms by treating the
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as as strategic variables. Notice that this means that the platforms can be viewed
as choosing the amount of air-time (or newsprint pages) to devote to ads, and
then selling the ad time (or space) at the price the market will bear. Equivalently,
because v (a) is monotonically decreasing, we can treat prices per ad per viewer
as the "strategic" variable. Alternatives, such as choosing ad prices per se, are
discussed below.
The rst-order condition for the ad-nance game is then readily expressed (by
maximizing lni) as the equality between two elasticities (Anderson and Gab-
szewicz, 2006), those of revenue per viewer and viewer demand. Equivalently,
letting a prime denote a derivative with respect to own advertising,
R0
R
=  N
0
i
Ni
; (1)
where N 0i < 0 denotes the derivative of the demand function with respect to its
rst argument (i.e., the full price). This equation underscores a crucial distinction
between cases when ads are a nuisance and when they are desirable to viewers.
To see it, assume rst that viewers are ad-neutral, so they are indi¤erent between
having an extra ad or not. Then platforms set ad levels such that marginal revenue
per viewer (R0) is zero. When ad levels do not a¤ect viewer levels, platforms simply
extract maximal revenue from their viewer bases. Otherwise, there is a two-sided
market e¤ect, and platforms internalize the ad e¤ect on viewer participation. For
 > 0 (ad nuisance) they restrain ad levels below the level at which marginal
revenue is zero. This entails ad prices above the "monopoly" level even when
there is competition among platforms. Conversely, for  < 0 they sacrice some
revenue per viewer by expanding ad levels in order to entice viewers and so deliver
more of them and consequently charge advertisers more per ad. That is, the ads
themselves are used as part of the attraction to the platform, though the platform
does not expand ad levels indenitely because then the revenue per viewer would
fall too much as more marginal willingness-to-pay advertisers would have to be
attracted.
The RHS of (1) can readily be evaluated for standard symmetric oligopoly
models with n platforms, to deliver some characteristic properties of the solution.
For the Vickrey/Salop (1964/1979) circle model, it is  n
t
(Choi, 2006, and Anderson
and Gabszewicz, 2006), where t is the "transport cost" to viewers. For the logit
model (Anderson, de Palma, and Thisse, 1992), it is  n 1
n
where  is the degree of
product heterogeneity.10 In both cases (as long as R
0(a)
R(a)
is decreasing, as implied by
the marginal ad revenue decreasing), a higher ad nuisance causes lower ad levels
10Similar properties hold for other discrete choice models with i.i.d. log-concave match densities
in that the corresponding expression is increasing in n: see Anderson, de Palma, and Nesterov
(1995).
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per platform. More preference heterogeneity (t or  respectively) raises ad levels
as platforms have more market power over their viewers. Increasing the number
of platforms, n, decreases the ad level. The analogy is that advertising is a price
to viewers, so naturally such prices go down with more competition. Because the
advertising demand curve slopes down, this means that the ad price per viewer
exacted on the advertiser side actually rises with competition (though the ad price
itself may not because viewer bases per platform contract). This result may reverse
when viewers multi-home, as discussed in the later Section 4 on multi-homing and
competition for advertisers.
The oligopoly analysis can also be readily extended to allow for asymmetric
platforms, with asymmetries in viewer demand functions allowing for quality
di¤erences such that higher qualities are associated to higher numbers of viewers
for any given vector of ad levels. Anderson and Peitz (2014) engage the structure of
aggregative games (which encompasses logit, among other demand structures) to
deliver a number of characterization results for market equilibrium. For example,
higher quality channels carry more ads, but nonetheless serve more viewers.11
The prot function formulation above readily extends to when subscription fees
are charged to e.g. magazine readers. Then there are two sources of revenue from
each reader, the direct fee and the ad revenue. The prot expression becomes
i = (si +R (ai))Ni (fi; f i) :
The solution (assuming that the ss and as are determined in a simultaneous
move Nash equilibrium between platforms with consumers observing subscription
prices and ad levels12) can be determined recursively by rst showing the optimal
split between si and ai while keeping readership constant. This device will allow
us to tie down equilibrium ad levels and then determine subscription prices. That
is, x fi = fi, and so maximize total revenue per reader, si + R (ai), under the
constraint that fi = si + ai, so asi = arg max
ai0
fi  ai +R (ai). Then asi  0 solves
R0 (as) =  (Anderson and Coate, 2005).13 This means that marginal ad revenue
should equal the reader nuisance cost: if it were lower then total revenue could be
increased by decreasing ads and monetizing the subsequent nuisance reduction into
the subscription price, and conversely. This relation embodies the 2 sided market
11This analysis is discussed at more length below (Section 3.4) when we discuss see-saw e¤ects
in media markets.
12For magazines, for example, subscription prices are likely determined in advance of advertis-
ing rates: it might be worthwhile to develop the analysis for the corresponding two-stage game.
Another theme to develop is price discrimination between newsstand and yearly subscription
prices.
13The result is generalized in Crampes et al. (2009) to a circle market structure and a general
advertising annoyance function. Anderson and Gans (2011) extend the result to a distribution
of  in the viewer population: then the average  determines a.
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phenomenon mentioned by Rysman (2009), that a stronger advertising side (a rise
in the revenue per visitor) implies less is earned on the other side because then
there is more incentive to attract viewers.
One immediate conclusion is that pure subscription pricing prevails if R0 (0) 
, which occurs if the ad demand is weak, and/or if ad annoyance costs are strong.
In this case, subscription prices are given by the standard Lerner/inverse elasticity
conditions for oligopoly prices the standard one-sided marketanalysis applies.
At the other extreme, for strong advertising demand (such that the implied
value of s is negative), and assuming people cannot be paid to watch, the business
model is pure ad-nanced. Note that if ads are desirable to readers ( < 0) then
ad levels are above the monopolylevel (dened as am = R0 1 (0)).
The constraint that si be non-negative is imposed because if not, readers would
be paid for getting magazines, and would then get lots of them and throw excess
copies away to collect the subsidies, which would be untenable. Assuming for the
moment that si > 0, and that R0 (0) >  so that there is at least some ad-nancing,
the prot function is given as
i = (si +R (a
s))Ni (fi; f i) : (2)
where as solves R0 (as) =  for all i and fi = si+as. As pointed out by Armstrong
(2006) the problem then has a familiar structure, though with an interesting twist.
The prot function above, and therefore the game and its solution, is just like a
standard oligopoly problem with R (as) entering as if it were a negative marginal
cost!14 The idea is that each reader carries with her an associated revenue. Hence
solutions can be found from solutions to standard oligopoly models with di¤er-
entiated products, modulo the caveat that subscription prices be non-negative.
Indeed, while standard oligopoly models return prices above marginal cost, here
an (unconstrained) solution would only return prices above  R (as), which might
well entail negative solutions for subscription prices. Therefore the subscription
price non-negativity constraint might well be binding. If so, the solution is pure
ad nance. This happens when as is above the level of advertising that would
be chosen for a free service,15 and the outcome is described already above as the
elasticity equality between ad revenue per reader and reader demand.
The logic above can also explain the coexistence of pay and free services in the
same market as a function of platform content. Loosely, media platforms with the
highest elasticity of subscription demand would be free while others would have
pay-walls. It follows also that those services charging subscription prices would
14And modulo the inclusion of a in the full prices in demands, which is like a quality
decrement to all platforms.
15Assuming quasi-concavity, the service is free if the slope RN 0i +Ni is negative at a
s, which
can be written as R
0(as)
R(as) <  N
0
i(a
s;f i)
Ni(as;f i)
:
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have a lower advertising level (i.e. as) than the free services.16 Using a model
of vertical product di¤erentiation, Gabszewicz, Laussel, and Sonnac (2012) show
that a free-to-air low quality media platformmay coexist with a subscription priced
high quality media platform. Anderson and Peitz (2014) use an aggregative game
formulation to determine when and which platforms use pay, free, or mixed nance,
based on program "quality" (by which we mean a favorable demand-shifter). Low
quality platforms are more likely to be ad-nanced, and high quality ones to use
subscription pricing.
We have treated so far the marginal cost to reaching consumers as zero. While
this ts well radio, TV, and the Internet, newsprint costs intervene for magazines
and newspapers. The analysis so far is readily adapted to these cases. Indeed,
it su¢ ces to include a cost ci per reader for the basic entertainment pages, and
a further cost per reader per page ca for the ad pages, and so the prot function
becomes
i = (si   ci +R (ai)  caai)Ni (fi; f i) :
Thus the analysis above goes through replacing R (ai) by ~R (ai) =  ci + R (ai) 
caai.17 In particular, the ad level is now determined by ~R0 (as) = . When  < 0,
this may mean pricing below cost, as developed in the next sub-section.
3.1 The ad revenue/ subscription revenue balance
This sub-section both delivers a description of equilibrium nance model for a
calibrated example for monopoly and illustrates some key features of pricing in
two-sided markets. It also delivers results about how the market business model
responds to changes in the demand strengths on the two sides of the market.18
Suppose that ad market demand is linear, so v (a) = 1  a and hence R0 (a) =
1  2a. In any equilibrium involving ads and subscriptions, then as = 1 
2
, so that
R (as) =

1 2
4

, and the subscription price solves 1 + (R (as) + s) N
0(f)
N(f)
= 0.
Now specify too a linear consumer demand function for the medium, N (f) =
1  f , with f = s+ a. Then s > 0 solves 1  s  as   (R (as) + s) = 0, or
s =
1
8
 
3  2 + 32 :
When s = 0 we have the pure ad-nance regime which solves R
0
R
=  N 0i
Ni
(see (1)),
16Recall that all media audiences are here assumed equivalent for advertisers. The conclusion
would be modied if the consumers of the paid media were more attractive for advertisers.
17One might also include some xed cost as an increasing function of the number of advertisers
(sales force e¤ort nding advertisers, etc.), which might be important empirically.
18This material is based on Anderson and Shi (2015).
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so
1  2a
a (1  a) =

1  a:
Whenever   1, the equilibrium is in subscriptions only. Then, given the linear
demand, s = f = 1
2
. The solutions for the equilibrium values as a function
of  are given in Figures 1 and 2. Figure 1 shows equilibrium participation on
the two sides of the market, namely advertiser and consumer levels. Both of
these are decreasing in  up to  = 1, whereafter there are no advertisers and
subscriber numbers are constant in the subscription-only regime. Put the other
way, the more consumers like ads - negative  is ad-loving, so that then the market
interaction involves bilateral positive externalities - then the more participation
there is from both sides. Notice that for  <  1 the yen for ads is so strong that
the number of advertisers goes beyond 1, which can be construed as pricing ads
below the marginal cost of delivering them (say the cost of printing the pages in
a magazine). This can make sense in a two-sided world because when ads are
attractive it is possible to charge readers much more for the media product. For
example, some newspapers carry some ads for free (such as the Hooks classied
ads in Charlottesville), and some vintage car magazines carry free ads with the
consumer footing all platform revenues.
Figure 2 shows the prices faced on both sides of the market (p and s) and
furthermore breaks down the full price paid by the consumers into the subscription
fee and the ad-nuisance (or benet, when this is negative). Notice the negative
ad price (noted above) for  <  1. For  < 0, the more consumers like ads then
the more ads they are delivered, even to the point of pricing them below marginal
cost. This is the idea from two-sided markets analysis of subsidizing one side of the
market to extract more from the other side: consumers are charged increasingly
higher subscription prices as they like ads more.
As  rises, the price per ad per consumer, p, and the consumer full price, f ,
rise too (consistently with the falling participation).19 Here the breakdown of f is
interesting: because the total ad nuisance rises for  > 0 then falls as ads disappear,
the subscription fee falls and then rises in order to have the full price rise. We will
see more starkly in the next example the U-shape of s, showing that a particular
subscription price can be consistent with one level of ad-loving, and one level of ad
annoyance. When ad nuisance is large, consumers are charged quite a high price
to avoid the ads, but when consumers like ads, they are charged a high price to
enjoy a lot of them.
One striking recent development in magazines is the drop in subscription prices
and tilt towards ad nance in the business model. Figure 3 plots the ratio of
19Despite rising prices on both sides of the market, platform prots fall consistently with  
as is clear more generally from applying the envelope theorem.
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subscription revenue to advertising revenue as a function of . Above the upper
bound  = 1 there is no ad revenue, while below  =  1 net ad revenue is negative.
The fraction of ad revenue is highest in the middle region around  = 0 where
ad revenue per consumer is greatest. For higher levels of ad nuisance there are
fewer ads and more is taken from subscription prices, while for ad loving there
are so many ads that little can be charged per ad to attract so many ads and
consequently charge consumers a lot for the benet from them.
For the parameters of these rst three Figures the subscription price is always
positive. This will not be the case for su¢ ciently strong ad demand. Figures 4
and 5 describe the equilibrium participation and prices respectively for the stronger
ad demand v (a) = 3   a (and with the same consumer demand as before, N =
1 f). These parameters lead to all three regimes being deployed as the equilibrium
business model, depending on . The new regime  pure ad nance  arises
in the middle, when subscription prices are zero. Consistent with the previous
description, equilibrium participation in the market for both sides falls with  and
is reected in rising ad price per consumer and rising consumer full price. The
kinks in the participation rates occur when s hits zero and the regime shifts to
ad-only nance. Once again, in order to get the consumer full price rising, the
subscription price is U-shaped.
3.2 Representative consumer models
Several authors use a representative consumer approach to modeling the consumer
side in media economics.20 There are pros and cons to proceeding thus. First,
it is not always clear what is obscured by aggregating explicitly heterogeneous
individuals and their choices. This issue is particularly germane given we have
drawn strong di¤erences in outcomes when some consumers multi-home from the
case where all single-home. The representative consumer consumes some of all
platformso¤erings, and on the advertiser side it is assumed that ads are valued
on each platform the same way regardless of whether the ad(s) are seen on other
platforms. The latter is consistent with the single-homing disaggregated approach.
Thus, one way to interpret the representative consumer is not as representative
in the traditional sense of aggregating disaggregate behavior, but instead more as
a typicalconsumer who watches multiple channels. This brings up a benet of
the approach, which is that it can deliver a multi-homing model for the consumer
side, and allow for allocation of time/attention across platforms. However, it must
also be assumed that any multi-homing advertiser puts ads on all channels at
the same time, so that the problem of what happens when a consumer sees more
20See for example Dewenter, Haucap, and Wenzel (2011), Cunningham and Alexander (2004),
and Godes, Ofek, and Sarvary (2009), in addition to the other papers cited below.
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than one ad from the same advertiser does not arise. (Note that these issues are
common to the advertising congestion approach deployed by Anderson and Peitz,
2014, and described further below). The model therefore may t TV (where one
can only reasonably watch at most one channel at any given time) rather than
magazines, where ads are not ephemeral. Alternatively, one might indeed assume
that the consumers response to any ad is independent of how many times she sees
it. Another point on the plus side is that it is important to explore alternative
settings, and to check for robustness of ndings.
There are two further issues. First, it is typically assumed that consumption
of a medium entails a constant money price per unit of time. However, most TV
channel subscriptions are all-you-can-watchafter paying a term subscription. A
second issue concerns the utility / demand functions frequently used, which are
based on the Shubik-Levitan (1980) linear demand system. This particular demand
system has been criticized for some perverse comparative static results in the way
it deals with entry of new products: the point becomes apparent in the implicit
representative consumer approach that generates it having extra interaction e¤ects
through the number of products per se.21
Kind, Nilssen, and Sørgard (2007) consider a quadratic representative con-
sumer utility function à la Shubik and Levitan (1980). They assume a three-stage
game structure whereby platforms rst set advertising space;22 then advertisers
choose how many ads to place on each platform; then the consumer makes her
viewing choices. Advertisers are potentially heterogeneous, but each advertiser
has a constant return per ad aired per viewer hour on a channel (regardless of how
many ads are seen and whether or not they are on other channels). Advertisers
are nite in number, so, because they act before consumers observe their choices,
each internalizes the negative e¤ect of its ad levels on viewersconsumption levels.
One result from the analysis is that advertisers make less prot the more platforms
there are. This result broadly concurs with the analysis of the disaggregated mod-
els: platforms raise prices per viewer to reduce ad nuisance which is how they
compete for viewers. This e¤ect reduces advertiser surplus per viewer (although
the e¤ect may be o¤set if the market is not covered because more viewers can be
reached, and depending on the ad demand function form). Although the mecha-
nism is a little di¤erent in the representative consumer context with the (partial)
internalization of own ad nuisance, the e¤ect is still there that set lower ad levels
when there are more platforms.
Kind, Nilssen, and Sørgard (2009) extend the model to consider mixed nance.
One other di¤erence from Kind, Nilssen, and Sørgard (2007) is that platforms set
21Nonetheless, Kind, Nilssen, and Sørgard (2009, fn. 9) note that their results are robust to
the exact specication of consumer preferences.
22They note their main results still hold if instead ad prices were chosen here.
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(linear) ad prices (per ad) in the rst stage, along with prices to the consumer per
hour of watching. Because of their game timing (whereby advertisers internalize
the e¤ect of their ads on the viewers choice), they break theR0(a) =  relation that
comes from the usual disaggregated model. This changes some characterization
results: e.g., the volume of advertising is larger the less di¤erentiated the platforms
(with the standard model, ad levels would be una¤ected per platform, although
indeed with partially covered markets the total level of consumer-ad-minutes would
typically rise as more of the market gets covered). Kind, Nilssen, and Sørgard
(2009) also address how the number of competitors a¤ects the equilibrium nancing
balance. While more competition decreases revenues from both sources (consumers
and advertisers), the share underwritten by consumers rises with the number of
platforms.
3.3 Competitive bottlenecks
The single-homing assumption used so far implies that each platform has a monopoly
position over delivering its exclusive viewers to advertisers. While there is com-
petition for viewers through ad nuisance, there is no direct competition for ad-
vertisers. This assumption gives rise to so-called competitive bottlenecksin the
market (Armstrong, 2002, 2006), as evinced by the price per ad per viewer exceed-
ing the monopolyrate against the advertiser demand curve (i.e., v (am) where
am solves R0 (am) = 0). This in turn generates several strong predictions that may
not hold in all contexts, and leads the discussion into the equilibrium e¤ects of
viewer multi-homing, which is continued in the next section. These anomalies were
rst pointed out by Ambrus and Reisinger (2006) and these "puzzles" are further
discussed in Anderson, Foros, Kind, and Peitz (2012).
The rst puzzle is that if a public broadcaster is allowed to carry ads then
the private broadcasters will be better o¤ because the private broadcasters pick
up some of the consumers diverted by the ad nuisance on the public channel.
With single-homing consumers, there is no direct competition for advertisers, who
multi-home. Anderson, Foros, and Kind (2015) give some anecdotal evidence that
instead private broadcasters do not relish there being ads on the public channel.23
Second, entry of an additional commercial broadcaster raises the equilibrium
ad price per consumer, although we would usually expect more competition to
reduce prices. This e¤ect, already discussed above, stems from competition for
consumers being in ad levels, which are the e¤ective prices paid by consumers.
These "prices" do indeed go down (just like prices go down with more competition
23Armstrong and Crawford (this Volume) give a spirited discussion of public broadcasting
in television markets. We do not enter here into the complex objective function of a public
broadcaster and how to model its behavior: for the point of the current comparison, we simply
assume that it moves from carrying no ads to carrying some ads.
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in standard one-sided markets), but when they do so we move up the advertiser
demand curve. The opposite direction of the change in prices is an example of a
see-saw e¤ectin two-sided media markets, as we discuss further below (Section
3.4).
Third, and related to the previous one, a merger reduces ad prices per consumer
because the merged entity raises the ad level (analogous to raising the price paid
by consumers in standard markets). Moreover, when the merged entity then gets a
smaller market base, its price falls a fortiori. Evidence on this e¤ect is mixed (see
the Chapters by Sweeting and by Chandra and Kaiser in this Volume). Mergers in
media markets are discussed further in the Chapter by Foros, Kind, and Sorgard
in this Volume. One theme that comes up in thinking about these puzzles in
the single-homing case is the realization that two-sided markets are quite di¤erent
from one-sided markets. Even though the equilibrium reaction to a change (such
as a merger) has the "expected" change on one side of the market (the consumer
side in the above examples), it may have the opposite e¤ect on the other side.
Anderson and Peitz (2014) christen this the "see-saw e¤ect" (see the next sub-
section below, Section 3.4) and illustrate several instances when it occurs when
consumers single-home.
A nal puzzle noted by Ambrus and Reisinger (2006) is the ITV premium
that programs with more viewers have ad prices that are more than proportionately
higher. The idea is that such programs are likely delivering viewers who are hard
to pick up on other programs, so this (as with the other puzzles) can be explained
by the existence of multi-homing consumers, to which we turn in Section 4.
3.4 See-saw e¤ects in Media Markets
A see-saw e¤ect(following Anderson and Peitz, 2014) arises when a change in
market fundamentals causes one group of agents served by platforms is better o¤
while the other group is worse o¤. In the media context, advertisers can be better
o¤ and consumers worse o¤, so giving a conicted interest to changes or legislation
concerning platforms.
In standard markets, there is typically a conict that a change (say rm exit)
can make rms better o¤ and consumers worse o¤. In two-sided markets, there
are three groups of agents who interact. Surprisingly, perhaps, what is good for
platforms may also be good for one group (typically the advertisers, which are
therefore counted on the side of platforms). The consequences for merger analysis
are treated by Foros, Kind, and Sørgard (this Volume).
Anderson and Peitz (2014) apply an aggregative game framework to a two-
sided media market context with competitive bottlenecks to address who are the
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winners and losers from changes in market circumstances (such as mergers, etc.).24
The motivating research question was to uncover when there can be see-saw
e¤ects that (say) advertisers are better o¤ while consumers are worse o¤ from
some change. This speaks to the heart of two-sided interactions.
The fundamental trade-o¤ is seen in an elementary fashion in the advertiser
demand curve for reaching consumers. The price per advertiser per viewer is on
the vertical axis, while the number of advertisers is on the horizontal one. But the
number of ads also represents the pricein terms of ad nuisance that is paid by
consumers in free-to-air broadcasting. So any move down the ad demand curve
tends to make advertisers better o¤ and consumers worse o¤.
Consider rst a merger between platforms. As long as ad levels (the strategic
variables) are strategic complements, such a merger makes all platforms better o¤,
including the merged entity (so there is no merger paradox this is true by
analogue to models of Bertrand competition with substitute products in standard
one-sided markets). What happens to advertisers depends on whether ads are a
nuisance to consumers or they are desired. In both cases ad levels move closer
to the monopoly levels, meaning that they rise for  > 0 and fall for  < 0.
Consumers are worse o¤ in both cases. For  > 0, advertisers are better o¤ (and
so there is a see-saw e¤ect in evidence) from the fact that prices per ad per viewer
fall. But this e¤ect is mitigated by the lower audiences for the ads. As Anderson
and Peitz (2014) show, advertiser surplus rises on the platforms that are not party
to the merger, but the e¤ect on the advertiser surplus that accrues on the merged
platforms is more delicate. Nonetheless, there are central cases in which it rises,
so then the total e¤ect is unambiguous and there is a see-saw e¤ect in operation.
For  < 0, the e¤ects go the opposite directions, and so merger is bad for all the
participants on both sides of the platform . These results serve to highlight the
idea that the traditional conict between rms and those they serve are much more
intricate in two-sided markets: the see-saw e¤ect draws this out.
Entry also involves see-saw e¤ects for  > 0. Consumers are better o¤ (with
more variety and more competition) but advertisers can be worse o¤ if the entrant
platform is a small player and the market is close enough to being fully covered.
However, for  < 0 (ad-appreciation) the interests of consumers and advertisers
are aligned in relishing entry.
Restricting the ad level of a platform (for example, a public broadcaster) has
24An aggregative game, following Selten (1970) has the simplifying structure that platforms
payo¤s can be written as functions simply of own actions and an aggregate which is the sum
of all platformsactions. Judicious choice of an aggregator can render a large class of games
as aggregative ones. One benet of the approach is to deal cleanly with heterogeneity across
platforms, for example in intrinsic program quality, and thus be able to give a clean cross-
sectional characterization of equilibrium. See Acemoglu and Jensen (2013) and Anderson, Erkal,
Piccinin (2014) for more details on aggregative games.
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an unambiguous see-saw e¤ect for  > 0. Consumers are happier with diminished
ads across the board (as the private companies respond with lower ad nuisance in
the face of tougher competition for viewers). Advertisers though are worse o¤ for
the twin reasons of demand diversion to the public channel where they are denied
communication with viewers, and the higher ad prices elsewhere, coupled to lower
audiences.
For a mixed-nance market, Anderson and Peitz (2014) consider asymmetries
between platforms to show that platforms with higher equilibrium consumer num-
bers have higher subscription prices because they correspond to higher qualities
to consumers. All platforms with positive subscription prices set the same adver-
tising level, as per our earlier results to this end. Platforms with too low qualities
set zero subscription prices (it is assumed negative prices are infeasible, for rea-
sons previously discussed), and the lower the quality, the lower the ad level that
is supported.
Suppose now that platforms are nanced by a mix of subscription prices and
ads, and consider a merger. Then, as we had for pure ad-nance, ad levels on all
platforms rise for  > 0 and fall for  < 0. Consumers in both cases are worse
o¤, while all platforms are better o¤. The consequences for advertisers are also as
before: there is a see-saw e¤ect (advertisers are better o¤) for  > 0 if all platforms
have the same quality, for example.
See-saw e¤ects are also apparent in other approaches. For example, Kind,
Nilssen, and Sørgard (2007) (who consider  > 0) nd that entry raises consumer
surplus but decreases advertiser surplus.25
There is not much work on see-saw e¤ects with consumer multi-homing. How-
ever, one example gives the opposite e¤ect from the single-homing case. Anderson
and Peitz (2015) in their model with advertising congestion (described below) nd
that advertisers lose frommerger while consumers gain. This is because the merged
entity internalizes ad congestion to a greater degree and so places fewer ads.
3.5 Heterogeneous ad nuisance costs, price discrimination,
and TiVo
Ad nuisance varies across consumers. This raises two issues: platforms might
o¤er di¤erent combinations of subscription price and ad nuisance, and consumers
might be able to access technology to strip out the ad nuisance. In both cases, in
equilibrium it will be those consumers most annoyed by ads who consume fewer
of them.
25Kind, Nilssen, and Sørgard (2009) does not consider a welfare analysis, being a Marketing
Science paper, although one would expect similar see-saw e¤ects to arise in that context. (Recall
it di¤ers from Kind, Nilssen, and Sørgard (2007) because it considers a mixed nance regime.)
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The rst of these issues is a second degree discrimination problem. Platforms
can o¤er di¤erent "contracts" and invite consumers to choose between them. Tag
(2009) analyzes a monopoly allowing two choices, which he restricts to being an
ad-only program and an ad-free pure subscription option. As he shows, allowing
for the subscription option induces a higher level of advertising for those remaining
on the ad-only option, in a classic illustration of the idea (going back to Dupuit,
1849) of "frightening" those with high ad-nuisance to self-select into the lucrative
subscription segment. While aggregate consumer surplus falls in his parameterized
example, advertiser surplus rises through lower ad prices per consumer, despite a
lower consumer base.
Anderson and Gans (2011) allow instead for consumers to choose a costly ad-
stripping technology (such as TiVo). They nd an analogous result to Tag (2009).
Selection into TiVo by ad-averse consumers leads a non-discriminating platform to
set higher ad levels on those (less ad-averse) consumers remaining because of their
lower sensitivity to ad nuisance. Ad-stripping ("siphoning" o¤ content without
paying the "price" of consuming the advertising) may reduce welfare and program
quality.26 The theme of ad avoidance is further developed in Stuhmeier andWenzel
(2011).
Various authors also consider mixed markets where di¤erent platforms concen-
trate on serving di¤erent consumers as a function of their ad-sensitivity. Anderson
(2003) and Lin (2011) look at a mixed duopoly with a free-to-air broadcaster and
one using subscription prices only. Weeds (2013) extends the analysis to look at
quality competition in a mixed duopoly with competition between a free-to-air
broadcaster and one using mixed nance.
3.6 Market failures in advertising nance
Market failures from market power are well established for oligopoly in one-sided
markets. Thus the subscription-only regime su¤ers from prices that are too high
and the markets served are too small. Now consider the mixed nance regime.
Again, oligopoly pricing leads to insu¢ cient site visitors. The level of ads provided
under a mixed nance system solves R0 (a) = . However, the social benet of an
extra ad is the demand price, v (a) (>R0 (a)) plus the extra advertiser surplus due
to the e¤ect of the extra ad reducing the market price of ads. This inclusive social
benet should be equal, at the optimum, to the nuisance cost, . This implies that
the market provision of ads is below optimal because the social benet exceeds the
private benet. Again, overpricing, this time in the ad market, is the usual concern
with market power.
Lastly, consider pure ad-nancing, where the upshot too many or too few ads?
26See also Shah (2011) for more on ad avoidance as well as time-shifting of consumption.
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is ambiguous. To see this, rst suppose that  = 0, so readers are ad-neutral.
Then, the optimum allows all ads with a positive benet to advertisers, so v (a) = 0.
The market solution instead delivers a lower ad level, where R0 (a) = 0. At the
other extreme, if  > v (0) the optimum has no ads at all by dint of the nuisance
exceeding the maximal ad demand price. However, under pure ad nance, the
market will always deliver some ads because they are the only source of prot.
Between these extremes, there will be too little advertising for low values of , and
too much for high enough levels of  (Anderson and Coate, 2005).
3.7 Alternative equilibrium concepts: Price vs. Quantity
The model presented so far follows the convention adopted by most articles that
the media platforms choose the amount of advertising (time length for TV, pages
for newspapers, etc.) and that this choice is observed by consumers. As already
pointed out, this assumption implies that we may view the choice of a as similar
to choosing a vertical quality dimension. While the assumption that the media
directly choose a might make sense for traditional media, it may be questionable
for modern media. For instance, the amount of display on a web-page may vary
with the short-term uctuations of demand for advertising slots. Auctions for ad
slots often impose a reservation price so that some slots remain unlled. Armstrong
(2006) and Crampes, Haritchabalet, and Jullien (2009) consider an alternative
scenario where the platform xes the price Pi for ads and lets the quantity ai adjust
to clear the advertising market.
If platforms choose their Pis, the situation becomes more similar to a standard
two-sided market, where the demand on one side depends on the demand on the
other side. While platform is prot is still i = Piai, determining the quantity
ai requires solving a complex xed-point problem to obtain the advertising levels
as a function of prices. For instance, in our base model this requires inverting the
system of equations:
Pi = v (ai)Ni
 
ai;a i

; i = 1; :::; n;
to obtain ads quantities as function of prices ai = Ai (Pi;P i). Whether price-
setting for ads results in lower or higher levels of advertising than quantity setting
depends on the sign of the nuisance term : To see this, consider the impact on
demand of a marginal increase in the amount of advertising. In the quantity-setting
game, the impact on subscription is just N 0i
 
ai;a i

, where N 0i denotes the
derivative with respect to the rst argument. In the price-setting game however,
there is a transfer of demand across other platforms. When the nuisance cost
() is positive, this transfer of demand attracts more advertisers to competing
platforms. This e¤ect attenuates the negative impact of platform i0s advertising
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on its subscriptions. Thus when consumers dislike advertising, the subscription
demand becomes less sensitive to advertising and as a result, the equilibrium level
of advertising will be higher with price-setting than with quantity-setting. The
reverse holds if consumers like advertising. Hence when  > 0; price competition
for advertisers leads to a more competitive outcome for advertisers.
A similar intuition applies for the e¤ect of the subscription price on demand.
When platforms x the price of advertising and advertising is a nuisance, the
subscription demand is less price elastic than when platforms x the amount of
advertising. In this case Armstrong (2006) and Crampes et al. (2009) conclude
that equilibrium subscription prices will be higher. Hence when  > 0; price
competition for advertisers leads to a less competitive outcome for consumers.
In both models the equilibrium level of advertising with mixed nancing is not
a¤ected by the nature of competition (price or quantity) for advertisers.27
3.8 Consumer information
The other assumption that has been questioned and analyzed is that of the observ-
ability of advertising levels by consumers before they patronize a media platform.
Non-observability may apply better in some contexts than others. Gabszewicz and
Wauthy (2004 and 2014) consider equilibria where each side28 does not observe the
other sides price and activity levels, and holds xed beliefs about the other sides
behavior (which beliefs are however consistent in equilibrium). These are referred
to as passive beliefs.29 To see how this works, suppose that in our base model,
consumers do not observe the amount of advertising ai before they decide whether
and which platform to consume. Then they expect some level aei that would not
vary if the platform actually decided to choose some di¤erent ai. In this case of
passive beliefs, the subscription demand is not responsive to the actual choice of
advertising and the prot is
R (ai)Ni
 
aei ;a
e
 i

:
27The reason is that for any given residual demand, it is optimal to set the advertising price so
that the quantity maximizes the joint surplus with the consumers R0 (a) =  that is independent
of the consumer market share, under the assumption that advertisersvalue is linear in audience.
28The sides are advertisers and consumers in the media context: Gabszewicz and Wauthy
consider bilateral positive externalities in the context of buyers and merchants holding and
accepting credit cards.Their later paper assumes single-homing while the earlier one considers
multi-homing. See also Section 4.3 below.
29See also Ferrando et al. (2008) and Gabszewicz et al. (2012). The concept was introduced
by Katz and Shapiro (1985). Hagiu and Halaburda (2014) provide a general treatment in a
two-sided market allowing a mix between the two types of consumersexpectations. Hurkens
and Lopez (2014) look at belief formation in two-sided market in the context of telephony.
21
As demand is xed from the platforms perspective, the equilibrium level of adver-
tising maximizes the revenue per consumer, R (a), and so is set at the monopoly
level am satisfying R0 (am) = 0. Thus under passive beliefs we obtain larger lev-
els of advertising than when ad levels are observed. As emphasized by Anderson,
Foros and Kind (2013, 2015), this leads to a hold-up problem. Once the consumer
is committed to a platform, the platform sets the monopoly advertising level.
Consumers rationally anticipate this high level of advertising and adjust de-
mand to Ni (am;am) : In particular the aggregate participation of consumers
will be lower under passive beliefs, while there will be more advertisers.
3.9 Non-linear tari¤s and insulated equilibrium
In most industries involving some form of network externalities, rms develop busi-
ness strategies aiming at facilitating consumers coordination, raising the benet of
positive network externalities or reducing the cost of negative externalities. The
ability of rms to cope with externalities and to capture the value created depends
in particular on the pricing instruments (see the discussion by Weyl and White,
2014).
With two-sided externalities, it is common that platforms o¤er complex tari¤s,
including tari¤s that are (at least implicitly) contingent on the level of participa-
tion on the other side of the market. Examples include click-through rates that
condition the total price paid by an advertisers on consumersparticipation, or
credit card fees that condition the merchant payment to the value of transactions.
As pointed out by Armstrong (2006), allowing for pricing contingent on the other
sides actions results in the existence of multiple equilibria of the pricing game.
For example, suppose that in the advertising nanced regime, platforms o¤er
two-part tari¤s to advertisers so that an advertiser pays Pi = fi + piNi. Then for
given tari¤s the advertising levels solve the system of equations
fi + piNi
 
ai;a i

= v (ai)Ni
 
ai;a i

; i = 1; 2::: (3)
Let us x all tari¤s except for platform i, which has prot R (ai)Ni
 
ai;a i

with the constraints
v (aj) =
fj
Nj
 
aj;a j
 + pj; j 6= i: (4)
Notice that only ai enters into the prot and the constraints. In particular,
any combination of xed fee fi and pi that satises condition (3) is a potential
best-response of platform i to the tari¤s of competing platforms. With this degree
of liberty we can nd multiple equilibria.
To see this, suppose that all other platforms except i choose a zero xed fee.
Then for any platform j 6= i; aj = v 1 (pj) is independent of platform i0s
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strategy. The problem of platform i is to maximize v (ai)Ni
 
ai;a i

under con-
straint (3). Any combination of fi and pi that yields the desired level of advertising
is privately optimal. Therefore platform i may choose fi = 0. Thus there is an
equilibrium where all platforms set zero xed fees. Because in this case choosing
pi is equivalent to choosing ai, this equilibrium coincides with the equilibrium of
the quantity setting game discussed above.
Suppose instead that all platforms j 6= i choose xed fees with pj = 0. The
problem of platform i is to maximize v (ai)Ni
 
ai;a i

under constraints (3) and
4. Again, any combination of fi and pi that yields the desired level of advertising
ai is optimal (and gives the same values for a i). Thus platform i may choose
pi = 0: When all platforms choose pi = 0; the situation corresponds to the price
setting game discussed above.
As shown by Armstrong (2006) for the case of pay media, there is a continuum
of equilibria that can be indexed by the slopes of the per-consumer tari¤ pi of
each platform.30 This raises two issues for applications. In some contexts, the
choice of tari¤ is naturally guided by observation of business practices, as for
credit cards or click-through rates. In this case one would like to understand the
reasons that motivated platforms for their choice of tari¤, whether they are issues
of implementation or more strategic considerations. In other contexts, there is
little guidance and we need some theory to proceed.
To address this problem, Weyl (2010) and White and Weyl (2014) propose the
concept of insulated equilibria. In their approach a motivation for the choice of
tari¤ is to improve coordination between sides by o¤ering tari¤s that o¤set the
e¤ect of other sides participation on the decisions of agents. They refer to this
concept as insulation.
To see the implications, consider the case of a monopoly platform. The par-
ticipation of consumers depends on their expectation of the advertising level. We
saw above that the outcome depends on whether consumers observe or not the
advertising levels. The monopoly would then want to achieve a given level of par-
ticipation in a manner that is robust to the nature of the coordination process.
In the above model this is simple to achieve: the platform just has to o¤er to
consumers a tari¤ contingent on the ad level, taking the form fi ai. In this case
the full price of watching the channel is fi independent of the level of advertising
so that the platform can anticipate demand Ni (fi) irrespective of what happens
on the advertising side. The advertisersparticipation can also be "insulated" by
setting a price pi per consumer (see below). Weyl (2010) refers to such a tari¤ as
an insulating tari¤ and shows that for a monopoly, the choice of insulating tari¤s
is equivalent to the choice of quantities on each side of the market.
30Reisinger (2014) proposes a solution based on the heterogeneity of agents with respect to
their trading volumes.
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White and Weyl (2014) extend the concept to oligopoly. Here platforms try to
secure their demand by "insulating" the demand on each side from the other side,
which intuitively means that demand remains constant when demand on the other
side changes (see below for a precise statement). The di¢ culty faced by a platform
is twofold. First, the platform must account for the tari¤s o¤ered by competitors,
so that insulation can only be for given competitorstari¤s on the same side of the
market (consumers here). Thus the platform can only insulate consumer demand
against changes in tari¤s to advertisers. Second, the value of outside options for
a consumer depends on the level of advertising on all the channels. This means
that the platform may need to make prices contingent on all advertising levels,
although we will see that this is not always the case. Formally, they suppose that
each platform can o¤er advertisers a tari¤Pi (Ni;N i) contingent on the consumer
allocation. On the other side, each platform can o¤er consumers a tari¤Si (ai; a i)
contingent on the vector of advertising levels on all channels.31 They say that
platform is tari¤s are insulating for given competitorstari¤s if the following two
conditions hold:
i) the tari¤ Pi (Ni;N i) is such that the advertising demand ai is independent
of N given the other advertising tari¤s P i;
ii) the tari¤ Si (ai; a i) is such that the consumer demand Ni is independent
of a given the other consumer tari¤s S i.
They show that an insulating best-reply exists for any tari¤s of competitors and
then dene an insulated equilibrium as an equilibrium of the competition game in
tari¤s such that all platforms o¤er insulating tari¤s.
Insulating tari¤s have the property that the equilibrium is robust to assump-
tions about the coordination of the two sides and formation of expectations. They
can thus be viewed as an appropriate tool for situations where platforms have
enough instruments at their disposal to overcome any coordination problem and
implement any desirable allocation on their residual demand curve.
To illustrate the concept, let us consider the mixed-nance regime above.
Consider rst the advertisers. As the benets of the marginal advertisers for
a mass ai is v (ai)Ni, it is immediate that an insulating tari¤ takes the form
Pi (Ni;N i) = piNi: Thus the media can set a price per user pi (per reader/per
viewer/per click). The amount of advertising is then ai = v 1 (pi) ; and it is inde-
pendent of consumer demand. As advertisers have a constant value per consumer,
choosing the price per user or choosing the quantity ai are equivalent.32
31Whether such contingencies are feasible may be debatable, but they argue that it can be
seen as a reduced form of a dynamic adjustement process.
32This is valid only if the value of users of one platform is independent of other platforms, and
thus if consumers single-home.
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Consider now the consumer side. The demand faced by platform i is then
Ni
 
Si (ai; a i) + ai;S i+a i

:
Intuitively if all competitors propose a tari¤ Sj = fj   aj; the insulating tari¤
for platform i is also of the form Si = fi   ai because then the demand is
Ni (fi; f i) independent of advertising levels. It follows that the equilibrium that
we derived before with platforms choosing advertising levels and a subscription
price (as in Anderson and Coate, 2005) is an insulated equilibrium. Under some
generic conditions it can be shown to be the unique insulated equilibrium.33
This shows that insulated equilibria may have a simple and attractive struc-
ture in some cases. In particular when consumers single-home, it provides some
support to the quantity setting model as the price setting game would not yield
an insulating equilibrium.
4 Multi-homing viewers/readers
The models described in the previous section suppose that each media consumer
chooses only one platform. However, advertisers choose to place their ads on
multiple channels. The behavior of the consumers is known as single-homing while
that of the advertisers is called multi-homing. This (unfortunate) nomenclature
comes from common usage in the context of Internet Service Providers. The
assumption that consumers single-home gives rise to the competitive bottleneck
property of the equilibrium (as discussed in Section 3.3), which has several strong
implications that may not hold in practice.
The competitive bottleneck and the ensuing predictions can change quite rad-
ically if viewers watch several channels over the course of the relative product
choice span. Or, indeed, if readers subscribe to several magazines, or web-surfers
go to several sites. Put simply, if ad prices are high on one platform, advertisers
can avoid it by reaching viewers elsewhere, which just is not possible under single-
homing. The competitive bottleneck is defanged by competition for advertisers.
Several di¤erent variants on this theme are described below.
The presence of multi-homing viewers would not alter the analysis if the return
to an ad on one platform were independent of whatever ads are on the other
platform. However there are several reasons for which a multi-homing viewer
di¤ers from a single-homing viewer for advertisers.
First, when a consumer watches several channels or reads several newspapers,
the level of attention devoted to each platform may be lower, which may reduce the
33A caveat is that if aggegate demand is xed,
P
iNi = 1, as in the Hotelling or Salop model,
there is a continuum of insulated equilibria. Thus the conclusion requires some aggregate demand
elasticity.
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e¢ cacy of advertising. Following this logic, Ambrus and Reisinger (2006) allow for
the possibility that an ad seen on a platform has diminished value if the consumer
seeing it is multi-homing. They assume that the value to an advertiser of such a
consumer is lower than for a consumer who single-homes.34 Athey, Calvano and
Gans (2014) point out that when multi-homing viewers switch between channels,
a single ad may reach a multi-homing viewer with a smaller probability than a
single-homing viewer who consumes all her content on the same platform.
Second, the return on an ad placed on one platform may depend on whether the
advertiser is already reaching the consumer through another platform. While for
single-homers an ad placed on two platforms is guaranteed only unique impressions,
this not so for multi-homing viewers. A second impression might have a lower value
for the advertiser than the rst impression. This implies that the additional value
for placing an ad on a second platform will be lower if there are overlapping viewers.
We investigate below the consequences of consumer multi-homing when the
value of a second impression is less than the value of the rst one. A rst con-
sequence is that the price of advertising is depressed as advertisers worry that
the ads they put on some platform generate second impressions rather than ex-
clusive ones (the latter is the case with only single-homing consumers). Building
on Anderson, Foros and Kind (2015) we start with simple presentation of the in-
cremental pricing principle that underlies the analysis of multi-homing consumers
by Ambrus and Reisinger (2006) and subsequent work. We then discuss how this
a¤ects equilibrium advertising levels depending on the context.
When demand is a¤ected by advertising we have the additional e¤ect that if ad
levels are low enough, multi-homing is attractive to consumers. However, low ad
levels also entail high ad prices, and herein lies the confound. In particular, with
high ad prices, advertisers are less likely to want to pay for ads on several channels
because adding a second channel delivers some viewers they already reach on the
rst one. This e¤ect fosters competition in the advertising market.
The viewer side in the duopoly analysis of Anderson-Coate was drawn from the
classic Hotelling (1929) single-homing set-up whereby viewers watch the closer
channel, corrected by ad-nuisance costs (which play the role of prices to viewers).
Ambrus and Reisinger (2006) and other contributors assume that viewers who get
a positive net utility from both channels (the consumers "in the middle" of the
Hotelling line) multi-home and are exposed to ads from both. Thus the marginal
consumer is indi¤erent between one of the channels alone and multi-homing.35
34They assume that the valuations are independent of how many ads are seen overall, so there
is no "information congestion" per se. A broader treatment might determine endogenously the
value of an impression on a multi-homer through a more explicit model of information congestion.
35One might think of preference congurations in which the marginal consumer is indi¤erent
between single-homing on two options, in which case the analysis would essentially be that of
the single-homing consumer model modulated by the competition for advertisers described in
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For simplicity, most authors have assumed model set-ups such that the marginal
consumer is indi¤erent between multi-homing and single-homing, and we follow
this approach because it appears to give the strongest di¤erence from the case of
pure single-homing described in the previous section.36
4.1 Multi-homing Consumers and Incremental Pricing of
Ads
To see most starkly the importance of multi-homing consumers on competition in
the advertising market, we start by assuming that the allocation of consumers to
platforms is xed. This would hold true when consumers are indi¤erent to the
presence of ads. We then indicate how the results can be extended to include
consumer preferences about ad content.
The role of multi-homing is brought out quite immediately in this context,
and shows quite transparently how it alters market equilibrium characteristics as
regards the impact of public platforms, entry, merger, etc. The analysis, which fol-
lows Anderson, Foros, and Kind (2015) highlights the incremental pricing principle
at work in the Ambrus-Reisinger (2006) analysis and subsequent papers.
There are n media platforms accessible for free (i.e., without a subscription
price) to a population of consumers (readers/viewers/listeners/surfers). Each plat-
form is nanced by advertising. The key modication is to allow for consumers
to watch more than one channel / buy more than one magazine.37 There is some
heterogeneity in the population so that some individuals may choose to consume
from only one platform (single-homing) while others choose to consume from both
platforms. Let NEi denote the number of exclusive consumers that platform i has
and let NSi be the number of consumers i shares with one other platform. Notice
that we do not specify with which other platform they are shared: we shall see
that this does not matter (modulo the exception for a public broadcaster not car-
rying ads) given the rest of the model set-up. The total number of consumers on
platform i is Ni  NEi +NSi .38
The advertiser side is like Ambrus-Reisinger, extending to more than two plat-
forms. As is assumed in all the papers discussed below, advertiser valuations are
independent of how many ads are seen overall, so there is no "information con-
gestion" per se. Suppose that there is a mass of A advertisers, all with the same
valuation for reaching consumers, so each of the A advertisers is willing to pay v
the next sub-section, or indeed there might be marginal consumers on all markets.
36Doganoglu andWright (2006) consider various permutations of marginal (and infra-marginal)
consumers in a two-sided platfrom context with bilateral positive externalities.
37See also Kim and Serfes (2006) for a multi-homing demand model.
38The di¤erence between the LHS and the RHS corresponds to consumers shared with more
than one platform.
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to contact a consumer. Furthermore, a consumer reached more than once on a
di¤erent platform is worth v + v so v is the incremental value of a second im-
pression. Impressions beyond two have no further incremental value.39 An ad seen
on one platform is worth vNi because it is viewed exclusively by all the viewers
of the platform on which it is aired. An ad that is seen on all platforms is worth
v + vNS, which is the full value of everyone reached once plus the incremental
value of those reached twice (recalling that the mass of consumers is normalized
to unity, and where NS = 1
2
P
iN
S
i is the fraction of viewers in the population
shared one time). If an ad is placed on all platforms except platform i; the ad on
platform i generates two benets. It brings a unique impression to the exclusive
consumers of platform i, and a second impression on consumers that platform i
shares with only one other platform. The Incremental Value of an ad on platform
i is the sum of these two benets, vNEi + vN
S
i , which we shall shortly see is the
equilibrium ad price.
Assume that platforms rst simultaneously set prices per ad, Pi; i = 1; ::n.
Advertisers then observe these ad prices, and then choose where to buy ads. Note
rst that it is an equilibrium for all platforms to price at incremental value, and
for advertisers to then place ads on each platform. If all other platforms price
at incremental value, then any platform would get nothing by pricing above its
incremental value, but would increase prot by raising its price were it pricing
below. Furthermore, this is the unique equilibrium: rst note that all advertisers
are on all platforms in equilibrium, for if a platform had no adherent advertisers
it would get no prot and could certainly get something by pricing at the value
of its exclusive viewers. But then, if all advertisers are to be on all platforms,
prices must be at the incremental values that each platform delivers. Therefore,
at the unique equilibrium, each platform sets a price per ad Pi = vNEi + vN
S
i ,
i = 1; :::; n so each advertiser places an ad on each platform. This is the principle
of incremental pricing, whereby each platform prices at the value of its exclusive
consumers plus the incremental value of those shared with just one other platform.
Note that any consumer shared with more than one other platform has no value
in pricing because they are already delivered at least twice.
As pointed out by Athey, Calvano, and Gans (2014), the principle of incremen-
tal pricing may explain why larger platforms charge higher prices per consumer
Pi=Ni = vN
E
i =Ni + vN
S
i =Ni. Indeed, this is the case if larger platforms share a
smaller percentage of their demand with other platforms so that the ratio NEi =Ni
is higher.
Consider now (in this framework) the presence of a public broadcaster newly
allowed to air ads. Then consumers shared between the public broadcaster and one
39Anderson, Foros, and Kind (2015) allow for further impressions to have value, but this is
suppressed here.
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private one are e¤ectively converted from being exclusively deliverable to advertis-
ers by the private broadcaster, so devaluing them in the ad price and hence private
prot. Similarly, those shared three ways in a combination including the private
broadcaster are reduced to zero value. These e¤ects are nuanced, as described
below at the end of this sub-section, when consumer demand is ad-sensitive.
The e¤ects of entry in this model depend on where the entrant picks up its
consumer base. If all its consumers are new consumers, entry does not a¤ect
existing platformsprots. If (as might be expected) a platforms exclusive and
shared viewers both fall with entry because the market is more crowded, then ad
prices fall with entry.40 The e¤ect on ad prices per consumer are more subtle,
because it depends on changes in the composition of consumers. This price goes
down if there are proportionately more shared-once consumers, or if it does not
fall as much as the number of exclusives (which might be the expected impact).
Merger in this framework is quite easy to deal with. The idea is that a merged
entity can still put A ads on each platform, so that the situation facing other
platforms is unchanged. However, the merged platform can now charge advertisers
for access to consumers that are now exclusive to the merged pair but were shared-
once between them before, so it can now charge v+ v for these, up from v each
before. It can also now charge v for any consumers attending the two merged
platforms plus one other, for these were worth nothing before.
4.1.1 Endogenous viewer choices
The results above readily extend to when consumers care about the advertising
levels, but do not observe them before choosing which platforms to attend. Recall
that we argued in section 3.8 that in this case, consumer demand depends only on
expected quantities and not realized quantities, so that with only single-homers,
the platforms would choose the monopoly quantity, here ai = A (with monopoly
price Pi = vN):
In the presence of multi-homing demand, platforms will still choose the maxi-
mal level of advertising ai = A, so each advertiser places an ad on each platform.41
Rational consumers then expect this maximal level of advertising on each platform
and choose platforms accordingly. At the (unique) equilibrium, each platform sets
a price per ad Pi = vNEi + vN
S
i , i = 1; :::; n where N
E
i and N
S
i correspond to
demands at the expected level of advertising, A per platform. Thus the principle
of incremental pricing still applies, and each platform prices at the value of its
exclusive consumers plus the incremental value of those shared with just one other
40I.e., if NEi (A) and N
E
i (A) +N
S
i (A), both decrease with entry.
41For any consumer expectations of a, platforms will price at incremantal values and so all
advertisers will advertise on all platforms. Thus the rational expectation is that a = A.
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platform.42
Notice that the price per ad per consumer, pi = Pi=Ni, may increase or decrease
with the strength of advertiser demand, A, depending on the e¤ect of ad nuisance
on the share of single-homers. Along similar lines, the price per ad per consumer
decreases if the number of shared consumers goes up with entry, or if it falls less in
percentage terms than the number of exclusive consumers (Anderson, Foros, and
Kind, 2015).
The model with endogenous consumer choices also ties together the single-
homing and multi-homing cases. For example, if ads are a nuisance to consumers,
allowing a public platform to air ads has two contradicting forces. First, if ads are
a nuisance the public broadcaster will tend to lose consumers, and some will be
picked up by the private platforms. If there is little multi-homing going on, this
e¤ect helps the private ones by expanding the base of consumers they can deliver
to advertisers. Conversely though, before allowing ads, any private broadcaster
sharing consumers just with the public one could count these as e¤ectively exclu-
sives, and even those shared with the public and one another broadcaster could
be charged for at v. After allowing ads, advertisers can reach such consumers
through the public broadcaster and this demotes their market value. If the value
v is low, or there are a lot of shared links that are thus devalued, the tougher
competition in the ad market will more than o¤set any demand diversion e¤ect.
4.2 Multi-homing consumer demand with observed ad lev-
els
We now extend the model to consider the e¤ect of advertising on demand when
consumers observe ad levels before choosing a platform (or can change after obser-
vation). Assume that there is some heterogeneity in the population so that some
individuals may choose to consume from only one platform (single-homing) while
others choose to consume from both platforms. Some contributions assume more
than two platforms, but the main intuitions can be explained with n = 2, which
we assume here.
For a given vector of advertising levels a = (a0; a1) on platforms 0 and 1,
we denote by NEi (a) the mass of exclusive customers and by N
S
i (a) the mass
of consumers who multi-home and thus are shared by the platforms. The total
demand addressed to an platform is thus Ni (a) = NEi (a) +N
S
i (a).
Consumer multi-homing results from the possibility of consuming contents from
both platforms when joining one platform does not exhaust all consumption possi-
bilities. Ambrus and Reisinger (2006) assume that the two platforms are not rivals
42The result readily extends along the same lines when impressions beyond the second have
value.
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in the market for consumers, so that their demands are independent. Specically,
they consider a Hotelling model with each platform at one extreme of a line and
they assume that consumers located on the line consume from each platform for
which their utility is positive. From the consumer side alone (i.e., in the absence
of the advertising side) this would be uninteresting because the platforms would
just face monopoly problems: it is the inclusion of advertisers that renders inter-
action. The demand structure implies that the multi-homing consumers will be
"in the middle" of the interval. If the platform at 0 sets ad level a0, its demand
is the set of consumers with positive surplus, thus all consumer locations x such
that V   tx  a0 > 0, where V is base consumption utility and t is the consumer
"transport" cost, here the disutility from distance in the program characteristics of
the platform at 0. Normalizing the consumer density to one, this yields a demand
No (a0) =
V   a0
t
, (5)
(when this is below 1) and likewise for the platform at 1. Consumers overlap (in
the middle) ifN0+N1 > 1, and the number of such overlappers (on both platforms)
is
NS (a) = max fN0 (a0) +N1 (a1)  1; 0g .
Consequently, the number of exclusive viewers on platform i is
NEi (a) = Ni (ai) NS (a) , i; j = 0; 1; i 6= j; (6)
which is simply the number not served by the rival.
Note that this demand implies that when the market is covered, platform i does
not control its mass of exclusive customers, which depends solely on the level of
advertising of the other platform. One could easily extend the model to obtained
more complex patterns (e.g., as in Gentzkow, 2007). As Ambrus, Calvano and
Reisinger (2015) emphasize, (6) applies more generally when the valuations for the
two platforms are correlated (but remain not rivals: a consumer listens/reads/views
platform i if his utility is positive irrespective of the utility at the other platform,
but correlation between values for the two platforms implies correlation between
individuals demands for the two platforms). The multi-homing demand then
depends on the correlation between individual demands for the two platforms. In
particular the share of multi-homers increases with the correlation between the
utilities.
With the forces discussed above in mind, we can now think about unilateral
changes that would support a particular equilibrium with advertisers multi-homing
(a0 + a1 > A).43 An ad on both platforms is still worth v + vNS (a), but an ad
43If a0 + a1 < A, then each advertiser patronizes one platform or none and the prices are
Pi = vNi (ai) : In this case each platform acts as a monopoly on both sides.
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on platform j alone is just worth vNj (aj). Di¤erencing yields the market-clearing
total ad price for platform i, in terms of N values, as
Pi = vN
E
i (a) + vN
S (a) ;
and duopoly platform is prot is
i = vNi (ai) ai   (1  ) vNS (a) ai: (7)
The rst-part, vNi (ai) ai, is the prot of a (non-discriminating) monopoly plat-
form. The presence of competitors induces a reduction in prots as multi-homing
reduces the attractiveness of the platform. In particular, a media platform sharing
demand with others would choose a lower level ai of advertising than a monopoly
if the demand from multi-homers is more elastic with respect to advertising than
the demand from single-homers, i.e., if
 N
0
i (ai) ai
Ni (ai)
<  @N
S (a)
@ai
ai
NS (a)
:
For a given total demand of a platform, the media platform would benet
from reducing the share of multi-homers among its customers so as to raise its
incremental value per consumer. This means that at the margin of the monopoly
level of advertising (at equal demand for its product), a platform serving some
multi-homing consumers would raise the advertising level if this reduces the share
of multi-homers. Thus entry may raise or reduce the level of advertising per
platform.
One implication of incremental pricing is that when the equilibrium involves
multi-homing advertisers, platforms will need to leave some surplus even to ho-
mogenous advertisers. By contrast, a discriminating monopolist owning the two
platforms could price-discriminate by charging di¤erent prices for ads depend-
ing on the whether the advertiser puts an ad on one or both platforms. Doing
so, the monopoly would extract the full advertiser surplus. Denoting by AS =
a0 + a1   A the mass of shared advertisers, the total monopolists prot is
 =
X
i
vNi (ai) ai   v (1  )NS (a)AS:
It follows from that the marginal prot for a monopoly is
@
@ai
=
@i
@ai
+ v (1  ) @N
S (a)
@ai
(A  a i) ;
where i is the duopoly prot dened in (7) and A a i is the mass of advertisers
exclusively on platform i: Thus, in the Ambrus and Reisinger setup, a monopoly
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would engineer a lower number of multi-homers, NS, than under duopoly. In partic-
ular, this implies that a merger reduces advertising if the consumer multi-homing
demand decreases with advertising.
Total welfare under discriminating monopoly is the sum of total vertical sur-
plus  and consumer surplus. Clearly, such a monopoly would set an excessive
level of advertising as it would not internalize the negative e¤ect of advertising
on consumer surplus. The same occurs for a duopoly if NS decreases with adver-
tising. These conclusions however hold only for homogenous advertisers (where a
monopoly achieves perfect discrimination) as we have seen that with heterogenous
advertisers, a monopoly would reduce the supply of advertising and advertiser
surplus.
Ambrus, Calvano, and Reisinger (2015) propose an alternative approach by
allowing homogenous advertisers to buy multiple ads on each platform. An ad-
vertiser which airs mi ads on platform i gets a return of  (mi) for each consumer
who is not exposed to the advertisers ads on the other platform. The return
on a consumer who is exposed to mj of the advertisers ads on the other plat-
form is 2 (m0;m1). With a unit mass of advertisers, all advertisers will advertise
on both platforms and mi = ai: For given intensities of advertising a0 and a1;
the lump-sum price charged to an advertiser for placing ai ads on platform i is
Pi =  (ai)N
E
i (a) + (2 (a)   (a i))NS (a), which is also the prot of platform
i.
In the same context of non-rival content as Ambrus and Reisinger, they con-
rm the result that a media platform facing competition will air more ads than a
monopoly if the demand from multi-homers is su¢ ciently more elastic to adver-
tising than the demand from single-homers.44 They also show that, for a bivariate
normal distribution of utility, this condition holds when the two platforms deliver
negatively correlated utilities.
4.3 Multi-homing consumers and heterogeneous advertis-
ers
One drawback of the two previous models is the simplifying assumption that adver-
tisers are homogeneous. The Anderson-Coate (2005) framework, and subsequent
models in that vein allowed for heterogeneity in the willingness-to-pay by advertis-
ers. In the presence of multi-homing consumers, di¤erent advertisers may choose
di¤erent portfolios of platform presence, and do so even if there is no correlation
44Their condition compares the ratio of ads-elasticities of the two demands with the ratio of
elasticities of advertising returns per consumer for multi-homers (2) and single-homers (). For
instance, if 2 =  (m0) +  (m1)    (m0) (m1), the condition of Ambrus and Reisinger is
su¢ cient for entry to raise ad levels.
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between advertiser demand and program choice (which remains a major outstand-
ing research problem).
As pointed out by Doganoglu and Wright (2006), when customers of two-sided
platforms are heterogeneous in their valuation of externalities, they will di¤er in
their consumption patterns. In the context of media and advertising, this means
that some advertisers will patronize only one platform while others will patronize
two platforms.
Indeed, a natural framework for extending the advertiser demand is to deploy
models of vertical di¤erentiation, which describe competition between rms sell-
ing di¤erent quality products to consumers who have heterogenous values over
quality. These consumers translate naturally in the media context to advertisers
which have di¤erent values for making an impression, and the "qualities" have a
natural analogue in the numbers of consumers attending each platform. Notice
that the standard models of vertical di¤erentiation (Mussa and Rosen, 1978; and
Shaked and Sutton, 1983, and Gabszewicz and Thisse, 1979 for duopoly) have con-
sumers making a single choice of option. In the oligopoly equilibrium, a rm with
a higher quality sells at a higher price to those consumers with high valuations.
The standard analysis was extended by Gabszewicz and Wauthy (2004) to allow
for consumer multi-purchase. The consumers who most value quality are those
who will multi-purchase in equilibrium. Their model can then be directly trans-
posed into the advertiser demand side in a fuller-edged two-sided market platform
context with "qualities" endogenously determined via the viewer demand side. In
the spirit of the multi-homing models above, overlapping consumers denigrate the
"quality" of buying the bundle of both platforms (an ad on each platform), so it
is not worth the sum of its parts. That is, advertisers who multi-home have to
"pay twice" for overlapped viewers, so only those advertisers with high willingness
to pay will multi-home if there are many multi-homing consumers (and second
impressions are not worth much).
To see how this works, consider the duopoly model with xed consumer de-
mands Ni and NS = N1 + N2   1. Suppose that v is heterogeneous. Faced with
ads priced at P1 and P2, an advertiser will multi-home if the incremental value of
each platform exceeds the price, thus if:
v > vm = max
i
Pi
Ni   (1  )NS :
Advertisers with a lower v will choose to single-home or stay out of the market.
This means that while the incremental value is the relevant one for high value
advertisers, competition with single homing prevails for low value advertisers. In
this set-up an advertiser which single-homes opts for platform i if vNi Pi is larger
than 0 and vNj   Pj. If the return to ads is a linear function of the consumers
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reached, then a price competition game for advertisers may fail to have a pure
strategy equilibrium.45
Anderson, Foros, and Kind (2013) engage such a (vertically di¤erentiated)
advertiser demand side with a specic consumer demand side that allows for con-
sumer multi-homing. They use the non-existence of a price equilibrium that we
just noted for some consumer allocations to rule out some types of congurations
in advertiser and consumer homing.
Their consumer model is a horizontal di¤erentiation model quite similar to
the one used by Ambrus and Reisinger (2006) that was described above.46 The
equilibrium concept is the same as that at the end of Section 4.1: consumers do not
observe prices but rationally anticipate them. A priori, four regime combinations
can arise: each side can fully single-home or have some multi-homers.
Consider rst any regime with single-homing consumers (SHC). This is the
"competitive bottleneck" case, so that all platforms set the monopoly ad level
am (and are expected to do so). It is an equilibrium as long as no consumer
wants to multi-home given the monopoly ad levels on all platforms. Note that
all active advertisers multi-home. Hence single-homing on both sides cannot hap-
pen.47 Another combination that cannot happen for a wide range of parameter
specications (including a uniform distribution of advertiser valuations) is partial
MHC with single-homing advertisers (SHA).48 Taken together, these results then
mean that the relevant market structures are restricted to multi-homing advertis-
ers (MHA) together with either single-homing or multi-homing consumers. The
former we have already described, and it involves rational anticipation of monopoly
ad levels.
The MHA-MHC equilibrium is the most intricate. One result (as follows from
footnote 45 above) is that there can be no symmetric equilibria even though the
model is symmetric. Asymmetries are somewhat to be expected given that the ver-
45For example, suppose that Ni = Nj . Then an outlet serves all the multi-homers if it sets the
higher price but it serves all multi-homers and all single-homers if it sets the lower price. The
advertising demand discontinuity implies that the price game has only mixed strategy equilibria.
46These models are described in more detail in the Peitz and Reisinger chapter of this Volume.
The Anderson-Foros-Kind model has multi-homing consumers who value quality increments of
their second-choice (further) product di¤erently from their rst choice. However, for the current
purpose, with symmetric media product "qualities", the model is the same as that of Ambrus-
Reisinger.
47The SHC-SHA combination can arise in the Ambrus-Reisinger model when the length of
advertisers is large enough that the sum of each platforms advertiser level is below the total
mass A.
48This is ruled out by the rst-order conditions on the advertiser side. However, SHA can arise
with full MHC. If all consumers are multi-homing, then platforms become perfect substitutes.
Equilibrium ad prices are zero, and advertisers are indi¤erent as to which platform to place an
ad upon.
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tical di¤erentiation model gives rise to asymmetric quality choices in its standard
incarnation (e.g., Shaked and Sutton, 1983). These results above are analogous
to those for the case of the model of Gabszewicz and Wauthy (2004) for bilateral
positive participation externalities.
The insight that the interaction between multi-homing and vertical di¤erentia-
tion may be a source of asymmetry is nicely illustrated by Calvano and Polo (2014).
In their duopoly model, as in Ambrus, Calvano and Reisinger (2015), homogenous
advertisers choose advertising intensity with decreasing returns to impressions, pa-
rameterized by the e¤ectiveness of each single impression. Consumers devote more
or less time to each platform, with large consumers multi-homing. They show that
when each impression is very e¤ective, and thus multiple impressions not valuable,
one platform chooses to be purely ad-nanced (and thus free to consumers) while
the other charges consumers for a service without advertising. The reason for this
asymmetry is that once one platform proposes advertising, the risk of multiple im-
pressions and low incremental ad price deters the other from doing so. According to
the same logic as Gabszewicz, Laussel, and Sonnac (2010), the ad-nanced plat-
form is a low-quality/negative-cost platform that sets a zero subscription price.
The duopoly then generates the same pattern of services as would a monopoly
screening ad-averse consumers from others with a free-of-ads service (Tag, 2009).
Athey, Calvano, and Gans (2009) point out that in practice platforms have
limited ad capacity. Their model di¤ers from above as they focus on the issue of
tracking (the ability to follow a consumers behavior on the platform) and account
for the fact that attention of viewers is a scarce resource. In their model, multi-
homing consumers spread their attention over the two platforms (they switch),
so that they are less likely to be reached than single-homers, and they combine
this e¤ect with advertiser value from multiple impressions. Limited attention
implies that the media platforms are constrained in their supply of advertising
slots (or impressions) per consumer. With xed single-homing and multi-homing
consumer demands, they examine the game where each platform chooses rst
advertising intensity and then prices adjust. Their asymmetric equilibrium exhibits
the same MHA-MHC pattern as described above, with low valuation advertisers
single-homing and high valuation advertisers multi-homing. In their analysis, as
more consumers switch between platforms, advertising capacity expands and the
platformsrevenue decreases.
4.4 Information congestion and multi-homing consumers
Information congestion in ads constitutes another channel through which multi-
homing can impact market performance. The congestion idea is that a consumer
is less likely to remember a particular ad the higher is the total volume of ads to
which she is exposed. The simplest way to formalize this (e.g., Anderson and de
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Palma, 2009) is to assume that the consumer will pay attention to at most  ads.
Notice rst that if consumers single-home, then platforms will just internalize
ad congestion by eliminating it and ensuring higher ad prices for those advertisers
with higher willingness-to-pay. Thus all that happens in a single-homing context
from allowing for congestion is analogous to an ad-cap of : high quality platforms
are e¤ectively constrained while low quality ones now compete directly against a
lower number of e¤ective competitors. Thus, ad levels tend to rise for the weaker
platforms the tighter is the cap that a¤ects the high-quality ones.
So suppose now that consumers multi-home. Anderson and Peitz (2015) model
this situation by assuming consumers choose how much time to devote to each
platform. Their time-use model is described in detail in Peitz and Reisinger (this
Volume). As indicated there, higher quality programs air more ads in equilibrium
but nonetheless enjoy larger consumer numbers. We here draw out the implications
for the various "puzzles" of the standard single-homing model.
The economics at work are those of a common-property resource (consumer
attention), modulated by platform heterogeneity (in quality). More acutely, a
larger platform  one with larger quality  internalizes more the e¤ects of an
increase in its ad level because it has more at stake in the total ad level.
Then the e¤ects of entry of a new platform are to reduce the stakes of incum-
bents, and so incumbents internalize to a lesser degree. This e¤ect renders their
ad levels higher, contrasting with the single-homing impact. In an analogous (but
opposite) vein, a merged entity has a larger stake in total congestion. It therefore
is more mindful of its ad level on total congestion, and the upshot is to set lower
ad levels. Allowing a public broadcaster to carry ads has two conicting e¤ects
on other platforms. It increases their demand through its ad nuisance, but it also
increases the congestion and competition for advertisers.
4.5 Take-aways and ways forward
Introducing actively multi-homing consumers makes a big di¤erence to both the
positive and normative analysis of media markets by inducing e¤ective competition
in the advertising market and breaking the competitive bottleneck that comes with
consumer single-homing.
Analyzing a model of search diversion,49 where platforms compete in reach and
price for advertisers, Hagiu and Jullien (2014) point to a complex e¤ect of multi-
homing that may raise or reduce reach, depending on the intensity of competition
on each side of the market.
More work is needed on formulating tractable models of multi-homing demand,
49Search diversion relates to interference by the platform in the consumer search process, which
includes intrusive advertising.
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and integrating them with endogenous multi-homing by advertisers. Various mod-
els of multi-homing demand per se have indeed been formulated, such as Kim and
Serfes (2006), Anderson, Foros, and Kind (2014) based on the Hotelling (1929)
spatial model. Anderson and Neven (1990) use a Hotelling-based model to de-
scribe consumers mixing between products (called "roll-your-own" preferences by
Richardson, 2006).50 There is also the random utility discrete choice model of
Gentzkow (2007).
While the work by Anderson, Foros, and Kind (2013) described above does
integrate partial multi-homing on both sides of the market, the model is not very
tractable, and does not readily extend (for example, to more platforms). That
model can also usefully be analyzed with the alternative equilibrium concept of
observable ad levels (in that vein, repeated interaction and long-term reputation
e¤ects could be usefully addressed, and the details ought to be eshed out).
There is therefore still a need for tractable and workable approaches to break
out the two-sided interaction when both sides are partially multi-homing.51 Indeed,
one path is to develop the time-use model in Anderson and Peitz (2015): the model
of ad congestion they engage is one way to deliver such interaction.
Other questions, in addition to the anti-trust treatment for such markets (see
Foros, Kind, and Sorgard, this Volume) include the e¤ects of multi-homing on
the other dimensions of competition, such as content provision. As discussed
in the next section, content provision is impacted by multi-homing because of
the desirability of attracting exclusive (i.e., single-homing) consumers, so that
platforms strive to provide content valued by single-homers to the exclusion of
multi-homers.
5 Equilibrium genre choices
In the broader perspective, program quality, type, and variety of o¤erings are
paramount to evaluating consumer satisfaction with media. The analysis so far
has concentrated on performance with respect to advertising choices while taking
as given the program o¤erings by platforms. Yet the types and numbers of choices
provided in the market are arguably at least as important to performance. We
now explore these extra dimensions to performance.
One of the earliest contributions to media economics (Steiner, 1952) concen-
trated solely on genre choice, while closing down the endogeneity of ad levels by
50Variants of this have indeed been already deployed in the context of media economics see
e.g. Gal-Or and Dukes (2003), Gabszewicz, Laussel, and Sonnac (2004), Richardson (2006), and
Hoernig and Valletti (2007).
51A theoretical analysis of this issue in the canonical two-sided market is Jeitschko and Trem-
blay (2015).
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the simple expedient of assuming ads are neither a nuisance nor a boon to con-
sumers (see Owen and Wildman, 1992, for a review of the early program choice
literature). We start at this point, and are able to draw on an extant literature on
product di¤erentiation with xed prices. We then expand the scope to consider
the role of endogenous ad choices in a full two-sided market context.
Steiner (1952) enunciated the duplication principle whereby media o¤erings
tend to concentrate (and double up) in genres with large consumer interest. Put
succinctly by example, if 70% of media consumers will only listen to Country
music, and 30% will only listen to Rock, and if there is only room for 2 radio
stations (due to spectrum constraints), then the market equilibrium will have 2
country stations. A two-channel monopolist will provide one channel catering to
each type and so cover the full diversity of tastes.
Beebe (1977) amended the set-up to allow consumers to have second prefer-
ences, and christened the Lowest Common Denominator outcome whereby a mo-
nopolist could provide a low-tier program type that many types would listen to,
while competition could provide more specialist higher-tier programming. These
themes are developed more in the Chapter on Preference Externalities (Anderson
and Waldfogel, this Volume) and implications for merger analysis are developed in
the Chapter on Antitrust in Media Economics (Foros, Kind, and Sorgard, this Vol-
ume). Of particular note is the implication that programming choices are driven
by advertisersdesire to impress consumers of genres more likely to buy the adver-
tised products. Even if many consumers are interested in Nature programs, their
preferences are not given much weight in a market system with ad-nance if they
are unlikely to respond to ads: sit-coms with ad-responsive viewers can instead
attract multiple (duplicative) o¤erings. The upshot is a rst-degree market failure
when preferences cannot be expressed through the market by viewer willingness-
to-pay. Of course, such problems are likely to be largely mitigated in the modern
context where product o¤erings are many, and consumers who are unattractive to
advertisers can nd their market voice through paying directly for content.
Steiners duplication principle nds its natural parallel in Hotellings (1929)
principle of minimum di¤erentiation. However, while Steiner envisaged xed
"buckets" of viewers, Hotellings model allowed for a continuum of types. The
"xed price" version of Hotellings model was extended to multiple outlets by
Eaton and Lipsey (1975), and many subsequent authors elaborated upon the
theme. One feature of such spatial models of localized competition52 is that there
are multiple equilibria (for six or more outlets in the linear market case) when a
xed number of outlets choose locations simultaneously, and that di¤erent posi-
tions can earn di¤erent prots, so some locations are more protable than others
52The term localized competition refers to the idea that outlets compete directly only with
neighboring outlets in the underlying space of program characteristics.
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in equilibrium. This raises the question of how outlets might compete, in a broader
setting, to get the better locations, and also the question of equilibrium numbers
of rms under free entry. One way to tackle the problem is to consider sequential
entry of foresighted outlets that account for both the locations of subsequent en-
trants and the possibility of deterring their entry. The problem is quite complex
because an outlet must consider the locations of future entrants, and how to use
future entrantsincentives to their own advantage (see for example Prescott and
Visscher, 1977). Due to the fact that entrants must t between existing outlets
(in their programming formats), the upshot can be that outlets in the market
can earn substantial pure prots in equilibrium (see e.g. Archibald, Eaton, and
Lipsey, 1986, for a forceful argument). The market may therefore involve a far
sparser coverage of product variety than would be suggested by models where
outlets are spaced so that all earn zero prot.
We now introduce ad nuisance into the spatial duopoly framework. We rst
treat single-homing consumers, and then allow for multi-homing.53 The set-up
is the traditional two-stage game applied to the media context. That is, we seek
equilibria at which platforms rst choose locations while rationally anticipating the
subsequent (second-stage) equilibrium in ad levels (and subscription prices, when
pertinent). The overarching principles governing equilibrium locations balance two
e¤ects in the rst-order conditions for best responses. First is the "direct" e¤ect of
moving toward the rival. This is positive, and picks up the idea that with full prices
constant, consumer bases increase when moving inwards. Notice that this is the
only e¤ect in models with xed prices, and is the driving force behind the Principle
of Minimum Di¤erentiation noted above. The second e¤ect is the "strategic e¤ect"
that moving in tends to intensify competition by harshening the rivals full price
(in the pricing sub-game induced by locations) and so hurts prot. This e¤ect
induces the desire to move away to relax competition. A balance between the two
e¤ects characterizes an interior solution.
With these e¤ects in mind, several results can be drawn o¤ the shelf from
existing equilibrium models of spatial competition. First of all, there is a direct
mathematical equivalence between standard models of price competition and mod-
els of ad-nance when advertisers all have the same willingness-to-pay, v. To see
this, notice that then is prot is given by i = vaiNi (ai; aj): writing pi = ai,
we have i = vpiNi (pi; pj), so that the prot is proportional to that in an equiva-
lent pricing game. The solutions are then those of the pricing game corresponding
53Gabszewicz, Laussel, and Sonnac (2004) analyse the free-to-air TV model allowing consumers
to mix between the programs of the two channels (as in Anderson and Neven, 1989). Gabszewicz,
Laussel, and Sonnac (2004) assume that ad nuisance is a time-weighted sum of ad nuisances to
a power  > 0 (i.e., the sum of a0 and a

1 ). When  <
p
2 they nd that platforms are at the
extremes (the normalcase would indeed fall in this range because  = 1). It is only for higher
 that platforms move in.
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to the demand system induced by the spatial structure that generates the demand
Ni (pi; pj). To take a central example, suppose that consumers are located on
the unit interval and consumer disutility ("transport") costs are quadratic func-
tions of distance, as per the modication of Hotellings (1929) linear-cost model
propounded by dAspremont, Gabszewicz, and Thisse (1979). Then the location
outcome (at least when locations are restricted to the unit interval) are the ex-
tremes, giving rise to a "maximum di¤erentiation" result. This is because the
strategic e¤ect of relaxing competition dominates the direct e¤ect for all interior
locations for this disutility specication.
Taken literally then, the prediction for genre choice is maximal variety dif-
ference between competing platforms, opposite the minimum di¤erentiation (or
duplication a la Steiner) predicted when there are no ad nuisance costs. The
inclusion of the nuisance cost leads platforms to separate to avoid ruinous compe-
tition in the ad "price" paid by consumers, and so to endogenously induce mutually
compatible high levels of ads. Note that the social optimum in this model is to
locate at the quartiles, so the equilibrium is too extreme.
When the advertiser demand is not perfectly elastic, Peitz and Valletti (2008)
show that (with a concave revenue per viewer, R (a)) maximal di¤erentiation still
prevails for high enough disutility ("transport") rates. For lower rates, platforms
move closer in equilibrium as the direct e¤ect kicks in. Likewise, lower ad nuisance
costs, , decrease di¤erentiation, although duplication (minimum di¤erentiation)
never arises for  > 0, for then ads and prots would be zero, which platforms
avoid by di¤erentiating.
We can also draw o¤ the spatial model shelf the equilibrium outcome for a
mixed-nance system (ads and subscription prices to consumers) by recourse to
the analysis of Section 2. Recall then from (2) that is prot is given by i =
(si +R (a
s))Ni (fi; fj) where as solves R0 (as) =  and with fi = si + as. This is
therefore equivalent to a situation in the standard pricing model where platforms
have negative production costs, as we previously established. Hence (modulo the
caveat discussed next on non-negative subscription prices), the location outcome
is maximal di¤erentiation with platforms setting ad levels to equate marginal ad
revenue per viewer to nuisance cost (Peitz and Valletti, 2008).
Gabszewicz, Laussel, and Sonnac (2001) engage the model above with a sur-
prising twist by assuming that platforms cannot feasibly set subscription prices
below zero - if people were paid to take newspapers, clearly they would walk o¤
with stacks of them. This oor can change the outcome quite dramatically. In
their model, they assume no ad nuisance ( = 0), so that the condition R0 (as) = 
for the ad level implies that ads are set at the per-consumer monopoly level, am.
However, the tenor of their results applies more generally.54 They show that if ad
54They assume ad demand is linear. They also consider a three-stage game with locations,
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revenue is weak enough, then maximal di¤erentiation attains; while if it is high
enough, the outcome is minimum di¤erentiation with free-to-air media (and both
constellations are equilibria for some intermediate values).55
The reasons can be ascribed to the interplay of strategic and direct e¤ects. For
weak ad demand, subscription prices are paramount, and platforms ensure these
are high by di¤erentiating maximally, which is just an extension of the standard
pricing result. However, for strong ad demand the direct e¤ect takes over because
picking up consumers to deliver to advertisers becomes predominant. When plat-
forms are close enough together, subscription prices are oored at zero. This takes
away completely the strategic e¤ect and we are back to the model with xed prices
and hence minimum di¤erentiation.
Gabszewicz, Laussel, and Sonnac (2001) relate their nding to the idea of the
"Pensee Unique," which is "a social context in which discrepancies among citizens
political opinions are almost wiped out" (p.642) (see Part III of this Volume, and in
particular the discussion in the chapter "Media Bias in the Marketplace: Theory").
Gabszewicz, Laussel, and Sonnac (2004) relate the degree of di¤erentiation of
free broadcasters to the elasticity of the nuisance term, higher elasticity leading to
less di¤erentiation. Location choice induces a strategic e¤ect that works through
increased levels of advertising when di¤erentiation increases, which explains why
free media platforms may choose maximal di¤erentiation. This e¤ect is reduced if
consumer demand is very elastic to advertising as advertising will vary little with
location, and in this case di¤erentiation will be smaller.
Many models compare free-to-air vs. pay and thus take the payment technology
as given (an early example is Hansen and Kyhl, 2001, whose thought experiment
is to consider a ban on using pay-walls for important sporting events and so put
the programming into the free public domain of commercial broadcasting). For in-
stance, Peitz and Valletti (2008) show that pay-platforms deliver more advertising
and higher total welfare than free platforms when the nuisance from advertising
is small. The reason is that large revenues from advertising are passed through to
consumers (a see-saw e¤ect). In the context of the Vickrey (1964) - Salop (1979)
model with free entry (discussed further below), Choi (2006) shows that, con-
then subscription prices, then ad levels. However, as they show, in the last stage the ad level is
set at the monopoly level, am, so that the upshot is the same.
55Bourreau (2003) analyses a similar model appending quality investment, where quality raises
consumer valuations vertically across the board. He contrasts advertising-nanced and pay TV
outcomes. In both cases, he nds equilibria that are symmetric in qualities ("mimicking"). Pay
TV gives extremal horizontal location outcomes, as per dAspremont, Gabszewicz and Thisses
(1979) classic extension to quadratic transport costs of Hotellings (1929) model. For advertising
nance, he considers a two-stage location then quality game with advertising revenues xed per
viewer. The direct location incentive is toward minimal di¤erentiation ("counter-programming")
this is o¤ set by a strategic e¤ect of more intense quality competition. The latter e¤ect is weaker
the lower are ad revenues, and he nds minimal di¤erentiation ensues as ad revenues go to zero.
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trasting with excessive entry in pay media, free media may induce insu¢ cient or
excessive product diversity. A di¢ culty with these comparisons is that, as pointed
out by Gabszewicz, Laussel, and Sonnac (2001), whether media platforms are paid
or free depends on the nuisance and constraints on payments. It is when ad nui-
sance is small and therefore advertising revenue large, that platforms will prefer
to be free rather than charging a positive subscription price.
Several papers discuss endogenous content quality in media markets. Arm-
strong andWeeds (2007) analyze program quality in a symmetric Hotelling duopoly
under pay TV and pure advertising-funding respectively.56 They nd that qual-
ity is lower in ad-nanced duopoly than in a duopoly where both platforms use
mixed-nancing. This is because of the higher marginal protability when two
revenue extraction instruments are available. Armstrong and Weeds (2007) get
several other interesting results. Under mixed-nancing, equilibrium prots are a
hump-shaped function of the strength of advertising demand. A weak advertising
demand is bad news for platforms, but so too is a strong one because then prots
are dissipated through high investments in quality to try and attract consumers.
Another intriguing result (reminiscent of Grossman and Shapiro, 1984) is that
platform prots are increasing in the marginal cost of quality investment. This
comes from the strategic e¤ect of softening competition.
Anderson (2005) looks at an asymmetric model of quality investment in which
one platform has a central role (like a "hub" or a Lowest Common Denominator)
and competes in local markets with local platforms. The central platform (think
Clear Channel radio, or Hollywood movies) competes in all local markets but a
local platform (Welsh language radio, or Bollywood) is also present in each local
market. The structure in each local market is like the Armstrong andWeeds (2007)
set-up, i.e., "Hotelling" segments with ad levels being set in local markets by both
the local and the global competitor, but all such local segments are e¤ectively
connected through the hub. The global producer here has an economy of scale in
quality provision because its quality is "one-size-ts-all" and applies to all the local
markets in which it competes. However, the local market decisions (advertising
levels) are tailored to each market. Through the quality choice of the global
platform, there are externalities between local producers even though they do not
interact directly. In equilibrium, the large platform chooses higher quality than
the local ones because it can spread its costs of providing quality over all the local
markets. Each local producers quality and audience share is larger in larger local
markets, and so the disparity is largest in the smallest markets.
Kerkhof and Münster (2015) analyze a di¤erent qualitymargin. They as-
sume that advertiserswillingness-to-pay to contact consumers is decreasing in a
56The analysis is extended by Weeds (2013) extends to a mixed duopoly comprising a free-to-air
broadcaster and another one that uses mixed nance.
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quality variable that consumers nd desirable. For example, consumers may ap-
preciate a serious documentary, but the framing e¤ect of embedding ads may make
them less willing to buy frivolous products. The platforms then face a classic sort
of two-sided market trade-o¤ that what is good for extracting revenue from ad-
vertisers (here lowquality) is bad for delivering the viewerseyeballs. Kerkhof
and Münster (2015) argue that a cap on advertising in this context can be welfare
improving. Their mechanism is thus di¤erent from the standard arguments about
ad caps (e.g., Anderson, 2007).57
The models so far discussed assume single-homing by media consumers. As we
argued in the previous Section, multi-homing consumers can be worth substantially
less (in a platforms consumer portfolio) than single-homing consumers. This e¤ect
can lead to bias in platform positions to favor catering to single-homing consumers
and against catering to multi-homing consumers. Since the single-homers are
worth more, platforms will strive to deliver such exclusive viewers while avoiding
overlapped consumers. The theme is developed in Anderson, Foros, and Kind
(2015) in a spatial duopoly model. As noted earlier, in the context of the Hotelling
model, the multi-homing consumers will be those in the middle of the market. The
less valuable these are (e.g. the lower the value of a second ad impression), the
further apart will platforms locate in equilibrium, and the worse o¤ are the multi-
homers. Athey, Calvano, and Gans (2014) discuss the supply of multiple content
in a model of decreasing return per impression and imperfect tracking of viewer
behavior. They show that a reduction of supply by one platformmay lead the other
platform to expand its supply. This points to a potential free-rider issue insofar
as investment by one platform to reduce the multi-homing demand benets all
platforms.
5.1 Free entry analysis
Classic analysis of long-run equilibrium with oligopoly or monopolistic competition
closes the model with a free-entry condition, which is often taken as a zero-prot
condition for symmetric rms. Equilibrium product variety is then described by
the number of products in the market. This can be compared to optimal prod-
uct variety to discern market failures in the overall range of diversity provided by
markets. Following Spence (1976), the market delivers excessive product variety
when the negative externality on other rms of entry (the "business-stealing" ef-
fect) dominates the positive externality on consumers from having better-matched
products and lower prices.
The canonical models that are usually analyzed are the CES representative con-
sumer model, the Vickrey (1964)-Salop (1977) circle model, and "random-utility"
57The latter paper also analyzes the e¤ects of ad caps on platform quality choice.
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discrete choice models such as the Logit. We concentrate on the latter two because
they derive from explicit micro-underpinnings for individual consumers.
Consider rst the mixed-nance context, whereby both subscription prices and
advertising are used. Then, the characterization of the start of Section 3 applies,
so that platformsad choices satisfy R0 (a) = . As we noted earlier, the implica-
tion for subscription pricing is analogous to there being a negative marginal cost.
Therefore, for the class of models that assume fully covered markets and symmetric
rms, because cost levels do not e¤ect equilibrium prots, the market equilibrium
is fully independent of the advertising demand. The implication is that equilibrium
product variety is not impacted by the advertiser demand strength. This strong
decoupling result implies that the standard Vickrey-Salop analysis goes through:
there is excessive variety in equilibrium (see Choi, 2006, for the statement in the
media context). The same remark applies to other covered market models (e.g.,
discrete choice random utility models with covered markets). This decoupling is
somewhat disconcerting for both the positive and the normative analysis, but the
problem is really the assumption that the market is fully covered. While the circle
model cannot be easily relaxed (apart from the trivial expedient of introducing low
consumer reservation prices and hence local monopolies), the discrete choice model
can allow for uncovered markets through "outside" options, and this reconnects
equilibrium variety to advertising demand strength.
The canonical model also assumes that the revenue per consumer R (a) is in-
dependent of the audience, which is questionable. For instance access to a large
customer base helps Internet platforms improving the e¢ ciency of their advertising
services. In more traditional media, the composition of the audience depends on
the content and a¤ects advertising demand (see the Chandra and Kaiser chapter
on Newspapers and Magazines in this Volume). A large audience with very het-
erogenous consumers may not be attractive for specialized advertising. Crampes,
Haritchabalet and Jullien (2009) point out that allowing R to depend on the con-
sumer base is tantamount to considering variable returns to scale in the audience,
with less (more) entry when the revenue R increases (decreases) with Ni.58
Now consider a regime of pure advertising nance. Here the advertising side
is reconnected to equilibrium diversity. Under the fully covered market speci-
cation (e.g. circle and logit) equilibrium ad levels and prots are decreasing in
the number of platforms (as long as R (:) is log-concave: see the analysis in An-
derson and Gabszewicz, 2005). The important point is that a weak advertising
demand delivers low equilibrium diversity because the economic impetus for entry
is absent through low protability from advertising. This indicates that market
failures through underprovision of variety can be especially severe in such circum-
58They also show that price competition on the advertising side delivers more entry in the
media market than quantity competition.
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stances, for example in less-developed nations. With strong advertising demand,
the classic over-entry result still attains: Choi (2006) notes the strong disconnect
between optimal variety and advertising levels in this case, albeit for the rst-best
optimum.59 Indeed, the disconnect holds whenever markets are fully covered: the
rst-best optimal ad level of ads satises v (ao) =  regardless of the number of
platforms.
Accounting for the endogeneity of the business model (free vs. pay) leads
to slightly di¤erent conclusions as the free-media business model emerges only if
the advertising demand is strong enough. As shown by Crampes, Haritchabalet
and Jullien (2009), imposing a non-negativity constraint on consumer prices raises
equilibrium prices (to zero) when they would be negative. This relaxes competition
for consumers, raises prots, reduces advertising and consumer surplus. As a
result, there is more entry and total welfare is lower when platforms are free than
if they could subsidize consumers participation. Moreover platforms rely more
extensively on quality improvement as an indirect form of subsidy, as well as tying
(Amelio and Jullien, 2012).60
6 Further directions
This Chapter has emphasized the theoretical insights from the recently developed
literature on two-sided markets applied to the context of media markets. Big
di¤erences in predictions arise in situations where consumers single-home (and the
competitive bottleneck of Section 3.3 applies) from when consumers multi-home
(as per Section 4). More work would be welcome here: some preliminary thoughts
in this regard are given in Section 4.5.
For empirical studies in the various types of media market, the reader is re-
ferred to the various Chapters in this Volume (radio, television, magazines and
newspapers, and internet), and the Chapter on empirical methodology for media
markets by Berry and Waldfogel. Clearly, more work that integrates the theory
and the empirics is strongly desirable.
While it is outside the scope of this chapter, we should mention the burgeoning
literature on targeting. This literature is mostly motivated by the development of
Internet technologies and the increased ability to tailor advertising to individual
preferences revealed by consumers behavioral history. This literature develops
explicit micro-models for advertising and sales suited for discussing the e¤ect of
59Considering a constrained optima, such as with a zero-prot constraint or the constraint
that platforms choose ad levels non-cooperatively would alleviate this separability result.
60Dukes (2004) analyses free entry with advertising for competing products. Lowering product
di¤erentiation reduces entry by media, thereby intensifying their use of advertising. High media
diversity (due to easy di¤erentiation) results in excessive advertising.
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targeting on advertising levels and prices.61
Athey and Gans (2010) point out that expanding advertising messages may
substitute for targeting, and they thereby relate the e¤ect of targeting on a plat-
forms revenue and consumers to capacity constraints in the advertising markets
or limited attention. Bergemann and Bonatti (2011) develop a model of competi-
tive advertising markets with targeting and congestion. The accuracy of targeting
has an inverse-U shaped e¤ect on the price of advertising, which results from
combining improved match values with increased product concentration on each
ad market. Athey, Calvano, and Gans (2014), discussed in Section 4.1, explore
further implications of tracking and targeting by competing platforms for adver-
tising contracts and platforms technological choices. Johnson (2013) examines the
e¤ect of targeting when consumers have access to a costly advertising-avoiding
technology. Starting from no targeting, consumers dislike increasing accuracy of
targeting due to a volume e¤ect while they like it at high level of accuracy due to
improved matches with advertisers. While this literature is at its infant stage, it
is a promising development for the future.
Although the recent literature has started to investigate advertising technolo-
gies in depth, there is surprisingly little theoretical research on the tailoring of the
content itself to the needs of particular advertisers. Indeed, while the literature
surveyed in Section 5 relates the choice of content to ad revenue, it never relates
consumerstaste to the particular types of advertising shown on the platforms.62
Recent exceptions are Athey and Gans (2010) who relate local advertising to lo-
cal newspapers, Athey, Gans, and Calvano (2014) who discuss the choice between
focused content and high reach content, and Crampes, Haritchabalet and Jullien
(2009) who relate the value of an impression to the size of the audience.
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